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Abstract 
In its admissibility decision in the Al-Saadoon case the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the United Kingdom had jurisdiction over 
the applicants, who had been arrested by British forces and kept in a British-
run military prison in Iraq. Just before the respective  mandate of the 
Security Council expired on 31 December 2008, the applicants were 
transferred to Iraqi custody at Iraqi request and thereby exposed to the risk 
of an unfair trial followed by capital punishment. In this respect, the case 
resembles the Soering case, although the applicants were, unlike Soering, 
not on British territory but on occupied Iraqi soil before they were handed 
over. This aspect raises the question of  the relative importance of  Iraqi 
sovereignty as a norm when in conflict with the UK’s human rights 
obligations. The authors trace back the ECtHR’s case law concerning the 
extraterritorial application of the Convention and continue to analyse the 
UK judgments and the ECtHR’s admissibility decision in the Al-Saadoon 
affair  in light of these  cases. Furthermore they consider the doctrinal 
consequences of the ECHR’s extraterritorial effect in cases like Soering and 
Al-Saadoon, where contracting parties violate guarantees of the Convention 
by exposing a person within their jurisdiction to a risk  of a treatment 
contrary to these guarantees by a third state. Finally, they test the argument 
brought forward by the UK that not transferring the applicants would have 
violated Iraqi sovereignty, examining established patterns through which the 
ECtHR and the UK Courts have coped in the past with international law 
norms potentially competing with the Convention. 
A.  Introduction 
Almost exactly twenty years after its famous Soering judgment
1
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1   Soering v. United Kingdom  [GC], ECtHR (1989) Appl.  No. 14038/88,  Series A 
No. 161. 
 the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rendered its admissibility   When Soering Went to Iraq…  463 
decision in the Al-Saadoon case.
2
Soering was an 18-year old German national, who had allegedly killed 
his girlfriend’s parents in the state of Virginia in the United States of 
America. After he had been arrested in the United Kingdom, the United 
States sought his extradition under the terms of the countries’ extradition 
treaty. In Virginia, the death penalty could be imposed after a conviction for 
murder; prisoners usually spent between six and eight years on death row 
before their execution. Soering claimed he could face the death penalty and 
the death row phenomenon if he were extradited. In its judgment on the 
merits, the Court found that the death row phenomenon could amount to 
inhuman treatment.
 Although the facts of the case resemble 
the Soering case, they differ in one decisive respect, raising questions about 
jurisdiction and the relevance of conflicts between the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR) and other international law norms.  
3 Since the applicant’s extradition to the United States 
would expose him to a real risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set 
by  Art.  3, the United Kingdom, extraditing Soering would violate that 
Article.
4
Considering that treatment contrary to Art. 3 would be inflicted by the 
United States, a non-member state of the ECHR, it is not surprising that this 
judgment was widely considered a watershed in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR.
  
5  Meanwhile the Court has confirmed and refined its reasoning 
repeatedly and extended it to the context of expulsion.
6
 
2   Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi  v. United Kingdom  (dec.), ECtHR (30 June 2009), Appl. 
No. 61498/08. 
3   Id., para. 111; reaffirmed in Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine,  ECtHR (2005), Appl. 
No. 38812/97, ECHR Rep 2003-V paras 133, 145. 
  Today it is 
4   Soering [GC], supra note 1, para. 111. 
5   Admittedly, the European Commission of Human Rights had already, before Soering, 
held that a person’s deportation or extradition may give rise to an issue under Art. 3 of 
the Convention where there were serious reasons to believe that the individual would 
be subjected, in the receiving State, to treatment contrary to that Article. See Soering 
v.  United Kingdom  Appl.  No. 14038/88,  EComHR (1989), DR°58, 230, para. 94; 
Altun v. the Federal Republic of Germany, Appl. No. 10308/83, EComHR (1983), DR 
36, 209; M. v. France,Appl. No. 10078/82, EComHR (1984), DR 41, 103; Kirkwood v. 
the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 10479/83, EComHR (1984), DR 37, 158. 
6   Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden [GC], ECtHR (1991) Appl. No. 15576/89, ECHR 
(1991) Series A No. 201;  Chahal v. United Kingdom  [GC], ECtHR(1996)Appl. 
No. 22414/93, ECHR Rep. 1996-V;  Jabari v. Turkey, (ECtHR 2000) Appl. 
No. 40035/98, ECHR Rep. 2000-VIII; Hilal v. United Kingdom, ECtHR (2001), Appl. 
No. 45276/99, ECHR 2001-II;  Ismoilov and others v. Russia,  ECtHR (2006), 
Application No. 2947/06; most recently confirmed in Kaboulov v. Ukraine, ECtHR   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  464 
established case law that a party to the ECHR exposing a person to the 
likelihood of ill treatment in a place outside its jurisdiction may violate 
Art. 3.  
Simplifying the facts of the Al-Saadoon case, they may be grasped by 
imagining Soering to be arrested and detained not in the United Kingdom 
but in occupied Iraq (B.). Accordingly, the Al-Saadoon decision (C.) gave 
the Court a new opportunity to express itself on the extraterritorial 
application of the ECHR (D. I.). Its jurisprudence on this matter has not 
been without contradictions in the past. This article will analyse relevant 
case law and seek to reconcile it to some extent (D. I. 1.). The legal 
uncertainty surrounding this issue will be illustrated by contrasting the 
reasoning of the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal of England 
and Wales when applying the Human Rights Act in the case of Al-Saadoon 
(D. I. 2.). When discussing the admissibility decision of the ECtHR, it will 
be argued that the Court in Al-Saadoon has further developed its case law, 
following a trend to shift the determination of jurisdiction from legal to 
factual criteria (D. I. 3.) As to the merits of the case, which have not been 
decided yet, it is submitted that the Soering principle applies to Al-Saadoon 
as well. Therefore, the Court’s previous jurisprudence on this issue will be 
analysed, thus speculating whether the Court is likely to follow the 
applicants’ arguments concerning a violation of the substantive rights of the 
Convention (E). Lastly the issue of conflicts between the ECHR and other 
rules of public international law will be discussed (F).  The possible 
conflicting norms of public international law will be mapped (F. II.), and 
different methods of coping with norm conflicts will be described as used in 
the past by the Strasbourg organs as well as the British Courts when 
applying the ECHR or the Human Rights Act, respectively (F. III.).  
B.  The Background to the Al-Saadoon Case 
The  Al-Saadoon  case concerns a complaint by two Iraqi nationals 
arrested by British forces shortly after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. 
They claimed that the British authorities in Iraq had transferred them to 
 
(19.09.2009) Appl. No. 41015/04. The Court has further expanded the Soering-
principle to claims of ill treatment not only at the hands of public authorities, but also 
by private groups and individual. See H.L.R. v. France [GC], ECtHR (1997) Appl. 
No. 24573/94, Rep. 1997-III (ill treatment by private drug traffickers), Ahmed v. 
Austria, ECtHR (1996) Appl. No. 25964/94, ECHR Rep. 1996-VI (warring clans in a 
civil war situation).   When Soering Went to Iraq…  465 
Iraqi custody, thus putting them at real risk of an unfair trial to be followed 
by execution by hanging.  
The British authorities in occupied Iraq formed part of the so-called 
Multi-National Force (MNF) led by the United States of America. After 
major combat operations of the invasion had ended, the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) was created as a caretaker administration until 
an Iraqi government could be established. In July 2003 the Governing 
Council of Iraq was formed and the CPA assumed a consultative role. An 
order of the CPA stipulated that, for the duration of the order, MNF 
premises on Iraqi territory were to remain inviolable and subject to the 
exclusive control and authority of the MNF. The following day full 
authority was transferred from the CPA to the interim government. 
Thereafter the MNF, including the British contingent, remained in Iraq 
pursuant to requests by the Iraqi government and authorisation from the UN 
Security Council. In November 2004, the United Kingdom and Iraqi 
authorities entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). It 
stipulated, inter alia, that the interim Iraqi Government had legal authority 
over all criminal suspects in the physical custody of the British contingent. 
The MNF’s UN mandate to remain in Iraq expired on 31 December 2008. 
Suspected of being senior members of the Ba’ath Party under the 
former regime, of orchestrating violence against the coalition forces and of 
being involved in the killing of two British soldiers by Iraqi militia forces, 
the applicants had been arrested by British forces following the invasion of 
Iraq and detained in British-run detention facilities. In December 2005, the 
British authorities had formally referred the murder case against them to the 
Iraqi criminal courts. In May 2006, an arrest warrant was issued against 
them under the Iraqi Penal Code and an order was issued which authorised 
their continued detention by the British Army. Their cases were then 
transferred to Basra Criminal Court, which had decided that the allegations 
against the applicants constituted war crimes subject to trial by the Iraqi 
High Tribunal (IHT), a court set up under Iraqi national law with the power 
to impose the death penalty. The UK Government had not been able to 
obtain an assurance from the Iraq authorities that the death penalty would 
not be imposed.
7
 
7   Al-Saadoon, supra note 
 The IHT had repeatedly requested the British forces to 
transfer the applicants into its custody. The applicants, in turn, had 
unsuccessfully sought judicial review of the proposed transfer before British 
2, paras 47, 96, 102.   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  466 
Courts.
8
C.  The ECtHR’s Admissibility Decision 
 Precisely on 31 December 2008, before the UN Mandate expired, 
the applicants were transferred to Iraqi custody contrary to a provisional 
measures order issued by the ECtHR on the same day. 
The applicants submitted to the ECtHR that their transfer to Iraqi 
custody breached their rights under Art. 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of 
torture), 6 (right to a fair trial) and 34 ECHR (individual application) and 
Art. 1 of Protocol No. 13 (abolition of the death penalty). Additionally they 
alleged that the transfer was in violation of Art. 13 (right to an effective 
remedy) and Art. 34 ECHR since transfer was contrary to an interim 
measure of the ECtHR issued under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court. 
The UK Government disputed that the case fell within the 
Convention’s territorial scope under Art. 1. Relying on the ECtHR’s 
Banković decision,
9
 
8   R (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2008] EWHC 3098; R 
(Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWCA Civ 7; for 
both decisions cf. M. Cross & S. Williams, ‘Between The Devil And The Deep Blue 
Sea: Conflicted Thinking In The Al-Saadoon  Affair’, 58 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2009) 3, 689-702; C. Romainville, ‘Contentieux Irakien 
et Extra-territorialité: De la nécessité de dépasser Bankovic’, 80 Revue Trimestrielle 
des Droits de l’Homme (2009), 1007-1036. It can be added that, on 9 September 2009, 
charges against the applicants were dismissed by the IHT on grounds of “insufficient 
evidence to support the crime” (reported by N. Bhuta, ‘Conflicting International 
Obligations and the Risk of Torture and Unfair Trial’, 7 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2009) 5, 1133, 1147). 
9   Banković and others v. Belgium and 16 other contracting states [GC] (dec.) ECtHR 
(2001), Appl. No. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII. 
 they argued that the Convention was not to be applied 
extraterritorially other than in exceptional cases. The mere exercise of 
military force against an individual was not one of those exceptional cases. 
Where a state was present in the territory of another sovereign state over 
which it did not exercise effective control, jurisdiction could only be 
established in accordance with international law, i.e. with the host state’s 
consent, invitation or acquiescence. In any event, such a basis ceased to 
exist after the UN mandate had expired on 31 December 2008. At that 
moment, the UK was obliged under public international law to surrender the 
applicants. The Convention could not be interpreted to require a contracting 
state to resist, by military force if necessary, the lawful demands of the 
police or other officials of a non-contracting state acting on its own territory.   When Soering Went to Iraq…  467 
Therefore, according to the government, the case was to be declared 
inadmissible in the first place.
10 Alternatively, they argued that there were 
no substantial grounds for believing that the applicants would face the death 
penalty. Also, no flagrant denial of a fair trial before the IHT was to be 
expected which could give rise to a violation of Arts 2 and 3 if followed by 
an execution. Their last argument again concerned their obligations under 
general international law. Since the death penalty was not contrary to 
international law, a refusal to surrender the applicants could not be justified. 
Rather, if they had released the applicants, or had given them safe passage 
to another part of Iraq, a third country or the United Kingdom, they would 
have violated Iraqi sovereignty and, moreover, would have impeded the 
Iraqi authorities’ ability to carry out their obligations under international law 
to bring alleged war criminals to justice.
11 Similarly, they tried to justify 
their breach of the ECtHR’s interim measure by referring to their 
obligations under international law. They maintained that an indication 
under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court could not require a contracting state 
to violate the law and sovereignty of a non-contracting state.
12
A Chamber of the Court declared the case admissible in part on 
30 June 2009. As to the extraterritorial application of the Convention, the 
Court recalled that the United Kingdom initially exercised de facto control 
over the detained applicants as a result of the use or threat of military force. 
Moreover UK’s de facto  control over  the premises was subsequently 
reflected in law, particularly by the CPA order stipulating the inviolability 
of the MNF premises on Iraqi territory and the MNF’s exclusive control and 
authority over them. The Court thus came to the conclusion that the 
applicants were within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction.
 
13  As to the 
alleged violations of the substantive rights, the Court declared part of the 
complaints inadmissible: The applicants had not exhausted domestic 
remedies with regard to the alleged violations of Arts 2 and 3 concerning the 
conditions of the detention and the risk of ill treatment in the Iraqi prison in 
which they were detained.
14
 
10   Al-Saadoon, supra note 
 The other complaints concerning the alleged 
risks attendant on trial, conviction and sentencing by the IHT were declared 
admissible, however, and notably not manifestly ill-founded (Art. 35 
2, paras 75-81. 
11   Id., paras 102-107. 
12   Id., paras 114-117. 
13   Id., para. 87-88. 
14   Id., para. 93.   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  468 
para. 3).
15 Finally the Court stated that the alleged violations of Arts 13 and 
34 concerning the breach of the interim measure were also to be examined 
on the merits.
16
D.  Jurisdiction Issues: Extraterritorial Application of 
the Convention 
 
The central question addressed in the Al-Saadoon  admissibility 
decision was whether the requirements under Art. 1  concerning the 
territorial scope of the Convention were met. Art. 1 ECHR states: “The 
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”. 
Unlike  Soering the  applicants in Al-Saadoon  were detained not on 
British territory but on Iraqi soil. The question therefore arises whether the 
Convention applies ratione loci. The answer depends on the meaning of the 
terms “within their jurisdiction” in Art. 1. In absence of a definition of the 
term in the Convention it is up to the Court to decide about the precise 
content of Art. 1.
17
I.  Previous Case Law – Far from Consistent 
 
1.  Early Approaches 
In their early case law, both the European Commission of Human 
Rights (EComHR) and the ECtHR were very generous when considering 
the extraterritorial application of the Convention. The EComHR held that 
the term “within their jurisdiction” was not “equivalent to or limited to the 
national territory of the High Contracting Party concerned”. Based on the 
wording, in particular of the French text, and the object of Art. 1, as well as 
on the purpose of the Convention as a whole, the Commission repeatedly 
stipulated that the contracting parties were bound to secure the rights and 
freedoms of the Convention “to all persons under their actual authority and 
responsibility, whether that authority is exercised within their own territory 
 
15   Id., para. 110. 
16   Id., para. 120. 
17   Art. 32 of the Convention defines the jurisdiction of the Court as encompassing “all 
matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention”.   When Soering Went to Iraq…  469 
or abroad”.
18 Thus for the Commission a state’s jurisdiction was not only 
not limited to its territory but rather depended on the exercise of “actual 
authority”,  a factual determinant. The Court followed this approach in 
Drozd and Janousek, a case which concerned the responsibility of France 
and Spain for criminal convictions by an Andorran Court equipped with 
French and Spanish judges. Here it stated that  responsibility  under the 
Convention could  be involved “because of acts of their authorities 
producing effects outside their own territory”.
19
2.  Cases against Turkey Regarding Northern Cyprus: The 
Concept of “Effective Overall Control” 
 
In subsequent years the Court upheld its assumption that the territorial 
scope of the Convention was not limited to the national territory of its 
parties a priori.
20 In the Loizidou case,
21 which concerned the consequences 
of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in July 1974 and its subsequent 
occupation of the northern part of the island ever since, the Grand Chamber 
recalled in its decisions on both the preliminary objections and the merits 
that the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ under Art. 1 was not restricted to the 
national territory of the contracting parties as a matter of principle.
22
 
18   Cyprus v. Turkey, EComHR,  Appl. Nos 6780/74 and 6950/75, EComHR Plenary 
(1975), DR 2, 125, 136; see also Hess v. United Kingdom, , EComHR, Appl. 
No. 6231/73, EComHR Plenary (1975) DR 2, 72 (73); X and Y v. Switzerland, 
EComHR, Appl. Nos 7289/75 and 7349/76, EComHR Plenary (1977) DR 9, 57 (71); 
Stocké v. Germany, EComHR, Appl. No. 1755/85, EComHR Plenary (1989) Series A 
No. 1999, para. 166. 
19   Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain [GC], ECtHR (1992), Appl. No. 12747/87, 
Series A, No. 240, para. 91. In this way the Court based the Convention’s application 
ratione loci on the concept of attribution, which is actually related to the application 
ratione personae. See on this issue: M. Milanović, ‘From Compromise to Principle: 
Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties’, 8 Human 
Rights Law Review (2008) 3, 411, 436-46. 
20   Accordingly, older textbooks on the ECHR teach that Art. 1 does not contain any 
territorial limitation; see J. G. Merrills & A. H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe, 
4th ed. (2001), 27-8; A. Carrillo Salcedo, ‘Article 1’, in L.-E. Pettiti et. al. (ed.), La 
Convention Européenne des Droits de l’homme, 2nd ed. (1999), 135, 137. 
21   Loizidou v. Turkey  [GC] (Preliminary Objections), ECtHR (1995), App. 
No. 15318/89, Series A No. 310;  Loizidou v. Turkey  (Merits) [GC], ECtHR, App, 
No. 15318/89, ECHR, Rep. 1996-VI. 
 In the 
merits judgment, the Court stated that the responsibility of a contracting 
22   Loizidou (Preliminary Objections) [GC], supra note 21, para. 62; Loizidou (Merits) 
[GC], supra note 21, para. 52.   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  470 
party might also arise when, as a consequence of military action, whether 
lawful or unlawful, it exercises “effective control of an area” outside its 
national territory. It derived the obligation to secure the rights and freedoms 
set out in the Convention in such an area from the fact of such control, 
whether it is exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a 
subordinate local administration.
23 The Court found it not even necessary to 
determine whether  Turkey actually exercised  detailed control over the 
policies and actions of the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus because it was obvious from the large number of troops engaged in 
active duties in northern Cyprus that Turkey’s  army exercised  effective 
overall control over that part of the island.”
24  The Grand Chamber 
confirmed this jurisprudence in 2001 in the case Cyprus v. Turkey.
25 
Additionally, another – new – aspect played a role in the Court’s reasoning, 
namely the “special character of the Convention as an instrument of 
European public order (ordre public) for the protection of individual human 
beings”.
26 Considering that Cyprus was a party to the Convention but unable 
to secure the rights under the Convention in its northern part, the Court 
concluded that “any other finding would result in a regrettable vacuum in 
the system of human-rights protection in the territory in question.”
27
In summary, according to case law until the judgment in Cyprus v. 
Turkey, Art. 1 was in principle not restricted to the contracting state parties’ 
 
 
23   Loizidou (Preliminary Objections) [GC], supra note 21, para. 62; Loizidou (Merits) 
[GC], supra note 21, para. 52. 
24   Loizidou (Merits) [GC], supra note 21, para. 56. Although the Court discussed the 
question of the Convention’s application ratione loci  under the heading “the 
imputability issue” (Loizidou (Preliminary Objections) [GC], supra note 21, para. 49), 
it did not determine whether the concrete incriminating act (the negation of the 
applicant’s property rights) was attributable to Turkey, but introduced the criterion of 
“effective control of an area” in order to attribute all acts in northern Cyprus to 
Turkey. 
25   Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], ECtHR, Appl. No. 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV, para. 77. 
26   Id., para. 78 (emphasis in the original). 
27   Id. This reasoning is somewhat similar to the Human Rights Committee’s approach to 
the rights of the ICCPR: “The rights enshrined in the Covenant belong to the people 
living  in the territory of the State party. […] once the people are accorded the 
protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory 
and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in government of the State 
party, including dismemberment in more than one State or State succession or any 
subsequent action of the State party designed to divest them of the rights guaranteed 
by the Covenant, See HRC, General Comment No. 26, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ 
Add.8/Rev.1, para. 4.    When Soering Went to Iraq…  471 
territory. When deciding on the Convention’s application ratione loci for a 
whole area it relied on the criterion of “effective overall control”, however it 
was not clear whether this applied only to cases in which a vacuum of 
protection would arise, i.e. on the territories of members of the Council of 
Europe. 
3.  Banković: The General Public International Law Concept of 
Jurisdiction 
The assumption that the application of the Convention is in principle 
geographically unrestricted was overturned in the Banković case,
28 which 
concerned an application made by persons injured and on behalf of persons 
killed as a consequence of air strikes carried out by NATO countries in 
Belgrade in 1999. The Grand Chamber conducted a very thorough analysis 
of the meaning of Art. 1, drawing on the customary law rules contained in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
29 and thus referring 
to the ordinary meaning (Art. 31 para. 1 VCLT) of ‘jurisdiction’ in public 
international law, to state practice under the Convention (Art. 31  para. 3 
lit. c VCLT) and to  the Convention’s travaux préparatoires  (Art. 32 
VCLT). It concluded that Art. 1 ECHR must be considered to reflect an 
essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction,  and that  other bases of 
jurisdiction, including nationality, flag, diplomatic and consular relations, 
effect, protection, passive personality and universality,  are  exceptional 
requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case.
30 
Thus,  Banković  can be considered to be a turning point in the Court’s 
jurisprudence on Art. 1
31
 
28   Banković [GC], supra note 
, introducing a strong presumption of territoriality 
of the ECHR by trying to harmonise the Convention with general 
international law. 
9. 
29   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
30   Banković [GC], supra note 9, paras 59-61. 
31   Accordingly authors use the term “pre-“, respectively “post- Banković case law”, see 
M. O’Boyle, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction, in F. Coomans & M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Treaties (2004), 125, 136; M. Gondek, ‘Extraterritorial Application of 
the European Convention on Human Rights’, 52 Netherlands International Law 
Review (2005) 349, 357; Milanović, supra note 19, 423; Likewise the House of Lords 
described  Banković  as a “watershed”, see R (Al-Skeini) v.  Secretary of State for 
Defence (Redress Trust intervening) [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 AC 153, para. 108 
(per Lord Brown).   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  472 
The  Banković  decision was widely attacked from various angles.
32 
The main objection of many commentators concerns the Court’s premise 
that the term ‘jurisdiction’ is to be understood in accordance with general 
international law. Some commentators argued that this was a 
misunderstanding which resulted from the Court’s disregard of its usual 
interpretative doctrine of the Convention as a living instrument and its 
reliance on the interpretative rules of the VCLT, the latter being construed 
to preserve the sovereignty of the state parties- a consideration misplaced 
when interpreting a human rights treaty.
33  Others found the VCLT 
applicable in principle but criticised the Court for overemphasising the 
ordinary meaning rule and not sufficiently taking into account object and 
purpose of Art. 1 and the Convention as a whole (Art. 31 para. 1 VCLT).
34
 
32   The most crushing critique comes from Lawson who was one of the applicants’ legal 
advisers in the Banković case, summarizing the judgment as “The Court got it all 
wrong”, see R. Lawson, ‘Life after Bankovic: On the extraterritorial application of the 
European Convention on Human Rights’, in Coomans & Kamminga (eds), supra note 
 
A very valid critique concerned the Court’s understanding of the ordinary 
meaning of the term ‘jurisdiction’ under general international law. It was 
pointed out that the term ‘jurisdiction’ was to be understood differently in 
different contexts of general international law. For example, it may be used 
with respect to the competence of a court, the domains of states in which 
they can act freely without outside interference (domaine réservé) or the 
31, 83, 85. Agreeing with Lawson’s statement: L. Loucaides, ‘Determining the Extra-
territorial Effect of the European Convention’, 4 European Human Rights Law Review 
(2006), 391, 400. For a positive critique see: G. Ress, ‘State Responsibility for 
Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations: The Case Bankovic’ 6 Zeitschrift für 
Europarechtliche Studien (2003) 1, 73-89. 
33   M. Breuer, ‘Völkerrechtliche Implikationen des Falles Öcalan’, 30 Europäische 
Grundrechte-Zeitschrift  (2003), 449,  450.  Compare the Courts rather thin 
considerations on this point in paras 64-5 of Banković [GC], supra note 9: “It is true 
that the notion of the Convention being a living instrument to be interpreted in light of 
present-day conditions is firmly rooted in the Court’s case-law. […] However, the 
scope of Art. 1, at issue in the present case, is determinative of the very scope of the 
Contracting Parties’ positive obligations and, as such, of the scope and reach of the 
entire Convention system of human rights’ protection.” 
34   Gondek, supra note 31, 360-3; B. Schäfer, ‘Der Fall Banković oder Wie eine Lücke 
geschaffen wurde’, 5 MenschenRechtsMagazin (2002) 3, 149, 156; K. Altiparmak, 
‘Bankovic: An obstacle to the application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in Iraq?’, 9 Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2004), 213, 223, 226-227; 
Romainville, supra note 8, 1022.   When Soering Went to Iraq…  473 
delimitation rules of the municipal legal orders of states.
35 The Court seems 
to have relied on the latter understanding of ‘jurisdiction’, thus conferring a 
concept which is used to determine the legality of the use of state power on 
a provision determining the applicability of a human rights treaty. If one 
took the Court at its word, the absurdity would arise that a person whose 
rights are affected extraterritorially by an ultra vires state action would be at 
a disadvantage in comparison to a person affected by legal state action.
36 
Alternatively, it was widely proposed that ‘jurisdiction’ in the context of 
Art. 1 should be determined by factual criteria –  whether state power is 
actually used or not – and not by legal criteria.
37 Such an understanding of 
‘jurisdiction’ would not be contrary to international law. It might not reflect 
the term ‘jurisdiction’ in international law when delimiting municipal 
spheres but it would reflect the understanding of ‘jurisdiction’ as applied by 
other human rights treaty bodies.
38
But even if the Court’s premise is incorrect –  and the unanimous 
Grand Chamber ruling therefore highly vulnerable from a doctrinal point of 
view  –  the  Banković  ruling is still not a lost cause. In a move mostly 
overlooked by commentators, the Court, acknowledging that other bases of 
jurisdiction exist although they might be “exceptional and requiring special 
justification in the particular circumstances of each case”,
 
39
 
35   Milanović,  supra  note 
 gave itself an 
opening and – as will be shown – took advantage of that opening in its later 
case law. It seized the opportunity to summarise previous cases in which it 
had affirmed the Convention’s application  ratione  loci  outside a state’s 
territory and established three categories of accepted exceptions to the 
territoriality of the Convention. First, it referred to the factual matrix in 
Drozd and Janousek  where  the Court accepted that the responsibility of 
19, 426 et passim; compare also M. Jankowska-Gilberg, 
Extraterritorialität der Menschenrechte (2008), 25-31. 
36   Gondek, supra note 31, 364; Romainville, supra note 8, 1021. 
37   Schäfer,  supra  note  34, 156, 160; Breuer, supra  note 33, 450; Altiparmak, supra 
note 34, 229, 241; Loucaides, supra note 32, 399; Milanović, supra note 19, 417 et 
passim; Jankowska-Gilberg,  supra  note  35, 140-143.  C. O. Judge Loucaides, 
Assanidze v. Georgia [GC] ECtHR, Appl. No. 71503/01, ECHR 2004-II. Agreeing 
with the Court: M. P. Pedersen, ‘Territorial Jurisdiction in Article 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’, 73 Nordic Journal of International Law (2004), 279, 
in particular 301.  
38   For an overview of the understanding of ‘jurisdiction’ in other human rights treaties 
see Gondek, supra note 31, 378-381; and more thoroughly: M. Gondek, The Reach of 
Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties (2009). 
39   Banković [GC], supra note 9, para. 61.   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  474 
contracting parties could, in principle, be engaged because of acts of their 
authorities that produced effects or were performed outside their own 
territory.
40  Secondly, it cited the factual matrices of the cases against 
Turkey, where as a consequence of military action it exercised “effective 
control” of an area outside its national territory,
41 adding that the state party 
which had “effective control” of the relevant territory and its inhabitants 
abroad had to exercise “all or some of the public powers normally to be 
exercised by that Government.”
42 Finally, it identified those situations in 
which  customary international law and treaty provisions recognise  the 
extraterritorial  exercise of jurisdiction by the relevant state, such as 
activities of diplomatic or consular agents abroad and incidents on board 
aircrafts or vessels registered in, or flying the flag of, that state.
43
These examples are all more or less in line with the reach of 
jurisdiction under public international law as the Court understands it. This 
is fairly obvious with regard  to  situations in which extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is accepted by customary international law and also where the 
government consented, invited or acquiesced in the foreign state’s 
jurisdiction over its territory. Additionally, in cases of military occupation, 
Art. 43 of the Hague Regulations
  
44 and Arts 47-78 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention
45
 
40   Id., para. 69. This example is rather ill-chosen given the fact that the case stems from a 
phase where the Court seemed to consider jurisdiction ratione loci  and  ratione 
personae as alternative concepts to establish the application of the Convention. In the 
concrete case, Spanish and French jurisdiction, as understood by the Court in 
Banković  did in fact exist though, since the judges operated in Andorra with the 
consent of the country. Still the Court did neither rely on this aspect then, nor when 
interpreting it in its Banković judgment. 
41   Id., para. 70. 
 allow for the exercise of certain powers by an occupying state, 
occupation being defined as territory “actually placed under the authority
 of 
42   Id., para. 71 (emphasis added); see on this add-on: Lawson, supra  note  32, 111; 
B. Miltner, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the European Convention on Human 
Rights: An Expansion under Issak v. Turkey’, European Human Rights Law Review 
(2006), 172, 176. 
43   Banković [GC], supra note 9, para. 73. 
44   Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 
Martens, NRG (3e série), vol. 3, 461. 
45   Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.   When Soering Went to Iraq…  475 
the hostile army
 “ in Art. 42 of the Hague Regulations.
46 Arts 42 and 43 of 
the Hague Regulations make it clear that it is a question of fact whether the 
law of occupation is applicable,
47 thus resembling the notion of effective 
control, which also solely relies on factual criteria.
48
This can be read as the Court requiring that exceptions to the 
territoriality of jurisdiction need to mirror the exceptions under public 
international law,  although it did not explicitly say so anywhere in the 
judgment. This concept of congruence between general public international 
law and Art. 1 only establishes the presumption that jurisdiction is supposed 
to be primarily territorial. Exceptions are supposed to require “special 
justification”; they do not necessarily need to be accepted under general 
public international law as well. In addition, the Court did not say that the 
given enumeration was exclusive.
 
49
In the case at hand, the Court was unable to subsume the NATO 
bombing under one of the recognised exceptions and also refused to come 
up with a new exception, instead concluding that there was  no 
“jurisdictional link  between the persons who were victims of the act 
complained of and the respondent States”.
 
50
 
46   Emphasis added. For the status of the 1907 Hague Regulations as customary 
international law see Case of Major War Criminals, International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, Judgment of 1 October 1946, Official Documents, vol. I, 253-254; 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
1996, 226, 256, paras 75, 79; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory,  Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, 172, 
para. 89. 
47   Cf. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v.  Rwanda),  ICJ, 47 ILM (2006), 271, 310, para. 173; 
R. Kolb & S. Vité, Le droit de l’occupation militaire (2009), 150-156; Y. Dinstein, 
The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (2009), 42-45. 
48   “Exercise of authority” is understood by some commentators of the Hague 
Regulations as existing “whenever a party to a conflict is exercising some level of 
authority  or control over territory belonging to the enemy”, thus resembling the 
Louizidou criterion of “effective overall control”, whereas others require that a party 
in a conflict is “in a position to substitute its own authority for that of the government 
of the territory”, reflecting the Banković  approach referring to “public powers 
normally to be exercised by that Government”, see R. Wilde, ‘Triggering State 
Obligations extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in certain human rights treaties’, 40 
Israel Law Review (2007), 503, 511, with references. 
 It further noted that the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia was not a party to the Convention and hence 
rejected the argument based on the legal vacuum to be feared if jurisdiction 
49   Cf. Ress, supra note 32, 84; Gondek, supra note 31, 371, 373;  
50   Banković [GC], supra note 9, para. 82.   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  476 
of the respondent states was denied (per Cyprus v. Turkey). The Convention 
was only to operate within the “legal space (espace juridique) of the 
Contracting States”.
51 Additionally, it rejected the applicants’ argument that 
the positive obligation under Art. 1 extended to securing the Convention 
rights in a manner proportionate to the level of control exercised in any 
given extraterritorial situation.
52  The Court was of the opinion that the 
applicants’ submission was tantamount to arguing that anyone adversely 
affected by an act imputable to a contracting state, wherever in the world 
that act may have been committed or its consequences felt, is thereby 
brought within the jurisdiction of that state for the purpose of Art. 1 of the 
Convention.
53
It follows from this that the Court in Banković not only turned around 
the assumption that the Convention also applies extraterritorially but also 
restricted its “effective control over an area”-doctrine in such a way that 
control needs to be comparable to public powers normally exercised by a 
government. Furthermore it rejected the idea that the contracting states 
might have limited obligations under the convention according to the 
exercised level of control, thereby strictly separating between jurisdiction 
ratione loci  and  ratione personae. Lastly,  it limited the Convention’s 
applicability to its espace juridique, in other words only on the territories of 
the Member states of the Council of Europe,
 
54 although different readings 
were also proposed.
55
 
51   Id., para. 80. 
 
52   Id., para. 85; Compare Lawson, supra note 32, 105, who submits that this “gradual” 
approach had always been implicit in the Strasbourg case law. 
53   Banković [GC], supra note 9, para. 85. 
54   Schäfer, supra note 34, 158 (with a subsequent critique); Ress, supra note 32, 84-85; 
R. Nigro, ‘Giurisdizione e obblighi positivi degli stati parti della  Convenzione 
Europea dei Diritti dell’uomo: Il caso Ilascu’, 88 Rivista di diritto internazionale 
(2005), 413, 422-423 ; Loucaides, supra  note  32, 398 (also with a subsequent 
critique); J. P. Costa, L’état, le territoire et la Convention Européenne des Droits de 
l’Homme, in: M. Kohen (ed.), La Promotion de la Justice, des Droits de l’Homme et 
du Reglement: Liber Amicorum Lucius Caflisch (2007), 179, 195; C. Droege, 
‘Elective affinities? Human rights and humanitarian law’, 90 International Review of 
the Red Cross (2008) 871, 501, 515.  
55   Compare Lawson, supra  note  32, 114; R. Wilde, ‘The “Legal” Space or “Espace 
Juridique” of the European Convention on Human Rights: Is it Relevant to 
Extraterritorial State Action?’, 10 European Human Rights Law Review (2005), 115-
124; T. Thienel, “The Judgment of the House of Lords in R (Al Skeini) v. Secrectary 
of State for Defence, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008) 115, 119-20,   When Soering Went to Iraq…  477 
4.  Öcalan: The Concept of Control and Authority over a 
Person beyond State Territory 
In the Öcalan case,
56 the applicant, the former leader of the Workers’ 
Party of Kurdistan (PKK), sought refuge in several countries after Turkey 
had accused him of terrorism and Interpol had issued a wanted notice (“red 
notice”). He was eventually arrested inside an aircraft in the international 
zone of Nairobi Airport by members of the Turkish security forces, 
supposedly acting in cooperation with the Kenyan authorities, and forcibly 
brought back to Turkey. The Chamber only touched upon the question of 
the extraterritorial application: “Directly after he had been handed over by 
the Kenyan officials to the Turkish officials the applicant was under 
effective Turkish authority and was therefore brought within the 
’jurisdiction’ of that State for the purposes of Art. 1 of the Convention, even 
though in this instance Turkey exercised its authority outside its territory.” 
The  Court considered that the circumstances of the case were 
distinguishable from those in Banković, notably in that the applicant was 
physically forced to return to Turkey by Turkish officials and was subject to 
their authority and control following his arrest and return to Turkey.
57 The 
Grand Chamber confirmed this finding in even shorter terms.
58
This ruling is consistent with the jurisprudence of the EComHR which 
repeatedly affirmed the application of the Convention ratione loci  when 
authorities of a contracting party had arrested an individual on the territory 
of a non-contracting party in cooperation with the latter.
  
59 Whether it also 
fits in with the Banković case depends on one’s reading of the latter. What 
can safely be said is that the Court did not apply any of the exceptions 
mentioned in Banković  to the facts of  Öcalan:
60
 
inter alia  suggesting that the Court was only pointing out that the applicant’s 
argument concerning the Cyprus judgment were misconceived in the case at hand. 
56   Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], ECtHR (2003), Appl. No. 46221/99, ECtHR (2003) and [GC], 
ECHR 2005-IV. 
57   Id., para. 93. 
58   Id., para. 91. 
59   Freda v. Italy, EComHR Plenary (1980), DR 21, 254 and Sánchez Ramirez v. France, 
EComHR Plenary (1996), DR 86-B, 155. 
60   In spite of this the Grand Chamber was of the opinion that its judgment confirmed 
Banković “by converse implications”, which points to the direction that it found one of 
the exceptions applicable. 
  This is immediately 
plausible with regard to Louizidou, because the Turkish agents did not have 
effective control over the Kenyan territory and acted in cooperation with the 
Kenyan authorities. Also the Court did not base its reasoning on any form of   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  478 
extraterritorial jurisdiction as recognised under customary international 
law.
61 Moreover it only examined the question whether the arrest of Öcalan 
was legal with regard to the merits and not to the admissibility. This allows 
for the presumption that the consent or acquiescence of Kenya which 
allowed Turkey to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction was immaterial for 
the question of whether the scenario fell within Turkey’s jurisdiction 
according to Art. 1.
62 Instead, the Court found it decisive that the applicant 
was subject to the “authority and control” of the Turkish agents.
63
Arguably, the Court has developed two approaches towards 
jurisdiction through factual control.
  
64 First, jurisdiction can exist when a 
state exercises “effective control” over foreign territory as foreseen by the 
law of occupation. Here the Court requires an abstract impact on all 
circumstances of daily life in a certain territory which is only conceivable 
on the basis of a state-like apparatus fulfilling governmental functions.
65 
Furthermore, this kind of extraterritorial jurisdiction seems to be restricted 
to the espace juridique of the Convention, thus limited to the territories of 
other contracting parties momentarily unable to fulfil their obligations under 
the Convention. Second, there is a different approach to situations in which 
a contracting party has “authority and control” over a person. Here 
jurisdiction exceptionally exists on an individual basis, superimposing the 
spatial jurisdiction of a contracting state over the territory of the host state 
only in relation to one specific person (or presumably to a group of specific 
persons).
66
 
61   See Breuer, supra note 
 Since the jurisdiction of the host state still exists, no vacuum 
needs to be filled; thus the requirement that the host state has to be a party to 
the Convention as well does not apply here. This kind of jurisdiction, 
however, is not reflected in general international law defining the legality of 
state power.  
33, 451.  
62   Gondek, supra note 31, 374; F. Rosenfeld, Die humanitäre Besatzung (2009), 117. 
For a different reading: Pedersen, supra note 31(it’s note 37), 299. 
63   An examination whether the exception of Drozd and Januszek applied is omitted, see 
supra note 40. 
64   Similarly already with regard to the Strasbourg organs’ case law prior to Öcalan: 
Miltner,  supra  note  42, 173-175; compare also F. Sperotto, ‘Beyond Bankovic: 
Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, 14 East 
European Human Rights Review (2008), 25, 39. 
65   T. Meerpohl, Individualsanktionen des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen 
(2008), 209. 
66   Id., 210.   When Soering Went to Iraq…  479 
The  Öcalan  judgment was often understood as a correction of the 
Banković decision turning away from normative towards factual criteria.
67 It 
has been shown, though, that Banković can also be read in a way that allows 
for exceptions to the territoriality of jurisdiction independent of their 
consistency with general international law. According to this reading, 
Öcalan would be perfectly in line with Banković. Be that as it may, when 
contrasted with Banković  the  Öcalan  judgment has one rather awkward 
consequence: When arresting somebody outside its own territory (and then 
possibly killing this person), the contracting party must abide to the 
Convention; when dropping bombs on another territory and thereby killing 
people it does not.
68
5.  Ilaşcu: Combining the Court’s Previous Case Law 
 
The Court’s ruling in Banković  and  Öcalan  on the Convention’s 
extraterritorial application was confirmed in the Ilaşcu  case,
69
What is instructive in the present context is the Court’s statement 
regarding Russia. It holds that due to Russia’s continuous and active 
military, political and economic support for the “MRT”, enabling it to 
survive by strengthening itself and acquire a certain amount of autonomy 
  although, 
given the complexity of the case, this is not immediately obvious. The case 
concerned events in that part of the former Moldavian Soviet Socialist 
Republic known as Transdniestria, which in 1990 declared itself to be the 
“Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria (MRT)” but has  never been 
recognised by the international community. Together with the three other 
applicants, Ilaşcu was arrested by agents of the “MRT”, for alleged anti-
Soviet activities and illegal subversion of the legitimate government of the 
“MRT”. Subsequently, Ilaşcu  was  sentenced  to  death  and  the  other 
applicants to terms of twelve to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The applicants 
claimed that both Moldova and Russia were responsible for the violation of 
rights under the Convention. Referring to Banković, the Court indeed came 
to the conclusion that the applicants were within the jurisdiction of both 
states.  
 
67   A. Clapham, ‘Symbiosis in International Human Rights Law: The Öcalan Case and 
the Evolving Law on the Death Sentence’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2003), 475, 480; Sperotto, supra note 64, 34. 
68   Similarly: Loucaides, supra note 32, 400; Altiparmak, supra note 34, 230. 
69   Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], ECtHR, Appl. No. 48787/99, ECHR 
2004-VII.   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  480 
vis-à-vis Moldova, the Russian Federation exercised “effective authority, or 
at the very least […] decisive influence”, which engaged its responsibility in 
respect of the unlawful acts committed by the Transdniestrian separatists.
70 
It has been concluded that the principles of extraterritorial application of the 
ECHR are valid not only in cases of military occupation sensu stricto but 
also in cases where a state party provides a separatist regime in another state 
with political, military, and economic support on a level which enables the 
separatist regime to survive.
71 This conclusion, however, mingles questions 
of both jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae. What can be safely 
said is that the “effective overall control” doctrine applies not only to states 
but also to non-state actors like separatist regimes. If such actors are 
supported by a state party with such intensity that they can be considered a 
“puppet regime” of that state party, their acts must be attributed to the state 
and thus give rise to the state’s responsibility under the Convention.
72 Thus, 
in its ruling with regard to Russia, the Court only combined the “effective 
overall control” doctrine, as developed in Loizidou and slightly modified in 
Banković, as an accepted exception from the territoriality of jurisdiction on 
the one hand, and the principle that a state might also be responsible for the 
acts of private actors  –  a question of the application of the Convention 
ratione personae
73– on the other hand.
74
The Grand Chamber further reaffirmed its Öcalan ruling at this point 
in time (only decided by the Chamber) by examining not only who had 
jurisdiction over the territory in question but also who exercised jurisdiction 
on a concrete-individual basis over the applicants in the situation at hand.
 It thus did not introduce a new 
basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction but simultaneously made use of two 
settled concepts. 
75
 
70   Id., paras 382, 392. 
  
71   Gondek, supra note 31, 372-373. 
72   Cf. Ilaşcu [GC], supra note 69, para. 318: “[T]he acquiescence or connivance of the 
authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of private individuals which violate the 
Convention rights of other individuals within its jurisdiction may engage the State’s 
responsibility under the Convention”. 
73   C. Grabenwarter,  Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, 4th ed. (2009), 70-71, 
para. 42. 
74   Similary: Nigro, supra note 54, 420. 
75   Ilaşcu [GC], supra note 69, paras 382-383.   When Soering Went to Iraq…  481 
6.  Issa: Mediating between Banković and Louizidou 
In the case of Issa,
76 the Court distanced itself from one of the key 
assumptions of Banković. This case concerned six Iraqi shepherds who were 
allegedly arrested and subsequently killed by Turkish soldiers in the course 
of a military operation conducted in Northern Iraq against Kurdish armed 
groups. The Chamber reaffirmed the Banković  decision, stating that the 
concept of jurisdiction for the purposes of Art. 1 of the Convention had to 
be considered to reflect the term’s meaning in public international law and 
was thus supposed to be understood as “primarily territorial”.
77  On this 
basis, a state’s responsibility may be engaged where, as a consequence of 
military action, whether lawful or unlawful, that state in practice exercises 
effective control of an area situated outside its national territory.
78
What is nevertheless notable is that the Court, admittedly only sitting 
as a Chamber, seemed to be very willing to accept that the Convention 
would also apply in Iraq if Turkey had exercised a higher degree of control 
over the entire territory, or alternatively over the specific area where the 
killing took place, despite the fact that Iraq lies clearly beyond the espace 
juridique of the Convention.
 It thus 
paraphrased its Loizidou decision and at the same time distanced itself from 
the restriction formulated in Banković that the state needs to exercise those 
“public powers normally to be exercised by that Government” on the host 
state’s territory. However, in the case at hand the effective control criterion 
was not fulfiled. 
79
7.  Conclusion 
 
We have attempted to outline the Court’s basic assumptions with 
regard to the extraterritorial application of the Convention as they have 
 
76   Issa and others v. Turkey, ECtHR (16 November 2004), Appl. No. 31821/96. 
77   Id., para. 67. 
78   Id., para. 69. 
79   Compare: Gondek, supra  note 31, 377; Miltner, supra  note  42, 176-177; Droege, 
supra note 54, 515; Rosenfeld, supra note 62, 117; Sperotto, supra note 64, 34-35; 
Romainville, supra note 8, 1026. Lawson has pointed out that the ECtHR’s ruling in 
Issa implicitly also opposes the Banković assumption that the contracting states need 
to secure “the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention” since no 
one would expect the Turkish forces in northern Iraq to do so to the Iraqi shepherds in 
the case at hand, but rather  to respect their rights only insofar as they actually 
interfered with their lives, see Lawson, supra note 32, 105.   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  482 
evolved over time. Nevertheless, the Court’s case law can safely be 
summarised as far from consistent –  oscillating between normative and 
factual criteria, mingling the Convention’s applications ratione loci with its 
application  ratione personae  and stressing or denying the Convention’s 
espace juridique. Therefore, it is no surprise that when the Al-Saadoon case 
was heard before the domestic courts of the United Kingdom, they came to 
different conclusions when applying the ECHR as incorporated in the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA)
80
II.  The UK Jurisprudence on Al-Saadoon 
 on the territory of Iraq. 
1.  The House of Lords’ Decision in Al-Skeini as a Precedent 
for the Convention’s Application ratione loci in Iraq 
The question of the application of the Convention for acts attributable 
to UK forces on Iraqi territory had already been an issue for the British 
judiciary prior to Al-Saadoon. In June 2007, the House of Lords gave its 
final ruling in the Al-Skeini case,
81 which concerned the deaths of six Iraqi 
civilians through shootings in the streets or in buildings, where UK soldiers 
were temporarily present, as well as the death of one Iraqi as a result of 
maltreatment by UK soldiers, which occurred while he was being held in a 
UK detention facility center in Basra. The Lords decided to follow the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the question of the extraterritorial application of 
the Convention, although the HRA only requires domestic Courts to “take 
[the ECtHR’s jurisprudence]  into account”
  82  and not to treat them as 
precedents. In doing so, the Lords found themselves confronted with the fact 
that “the judgments and decisions of the European Court do not speak with 
one voice”,
83 especially with regard to Banković on the one and hand Issa 
on the other.
84
 
80   Human Rights Act 1988, commenced 2 October 2000. 
 However, they decided to give pre-eminence to the Grand 
81   R (Al-Skeini), supra note 31; for a critique of this decision see R. Wilde, note on ‘R 
(on the application of Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of state for Defence (Redress Trust 
intervening)’, 102 American Journal of International Law (2008), 628. 
82   Art. 2 para. 1 lit. a HRA reads: “A court or tribunal determining a question which has 
arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account any judgment, 
decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights”. 
83   R (Al-Skeini), supra note 31, para. 67 (per Lord Roger). 
84   Id., paras 68-80 (per Lord Roger).   When Soering Went to Iraq…  483 
Chamber decision in Banković.
85 The Lords’ reading of Banković included 
the assumption that jurisdiction based on effective control was recognised 
“only in the case of territory which would normally be covered by the 
Convention”.
86 Moreover, they found the ECtHR had suggested in Banković 
that “the obligation under article 1 can arise only where the contracting state 
has such effective control of the territory of another state that it could secure 
to everyone in the territory all the rights and freedoms in Section 1 of the 
Convention.”
87 On that basis, they ruled that the five appellants who had 
been killed on Iraqi territory were not within the jurisdiction of the United 
Kingdom.
88 Alternatively, they asserted that even if Issa was to be followed 
and the Convention’s application was not geographically restricted 
accordingly, they “would not consider that the United Kingdom was in 
effective control of Basra and the surrounding area for purposes of 
jurisdiction under article 1 of the Convention at the relevant time”, because 
“with all its troops doing their best, the United Kingdom did not even have 
the kind of control of Basra and the surrounding area which would have 
allowed it to discharge the obligations, including the positive obligations, of 
a contracting state under article 2”.
89 With regard to the sixth appellant, who 
was beaten up by British troops in military detention and subsequently died, 
the Secretary of State had meanwhile accepted that “since the events 
occurred in the British detention unit, Mr Mousa met his death ‘within the 
jurisdiction’ of the United Kingdom for purposes of article 1 of the 
Convention.”
90 Therefore, the Lords did not need to rule on this point but 
still endorsed the finding on grounds of an analogy to the jurisdiction in 
embassies and consulates under customary international law as a recognised 
exception in Banković.
91 It has been pointed out that this analogy does not 
hold given that military prisons do not have any special status under 
international law.
92
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para. 90. 
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 In lieu of relying on Banković the British jurisdiction 
over Basra prison can rather be explained by an extension of the Öcalan 
89   Id., para. 83 (per Lord Roger); endorsed by Baroness Hale at para. 90. See also supra 
note 79 as to the range of rights which need to be guaranteed according to Issa. 
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91   Id., para. 132 (per Lord Brown); para. 61 (per Lord Carswell). 
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jurisprudence though, since a person held in prison can be considered as 
under the “authority and control” of the country running this prison.
93
2.  The Decision of the High Court of Justice in Al-Saadoon 
 
In the Al-Saadoon case, the High Court remarked that the position of 
the claimants was indistinguishable from that of Mr Mousa, in the Al-Skeini 
case, in terms of physical custody.
94 Thus, “[o]n the face of it, applying the 
same approach to the claimants’ case would seem to lead to the conclusion 
that they, too, are within the article 1 jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.”
95 
However, the High Court went on to examine whether there were grounds 
for distinguishing this case from Al-Skeini on the question of jurisdiction. In 
this respect, the Secretary of State submitted that, notwithstanding that the 
claimants were in the physical custody of British forces, they were not 
within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for the purposes of Art. 1 
because the applicants were being held as criminal suspects at the order of 
the Iraqi court, a judicial organ of the sovereign state of Iraq. Accordingly, 
the legal authority being exercised over them was that of Iraq, exercising 
sovereignty on its own territory in relation to its own nationals. Moreover, 
the United Kingdom was obliged as a matter of international law to transfer 
the claimants to the custody of the Iraqi court as requested by that court.
96
As to this second argument, it implies that an obligation under 
international law could displace the Convention. In order to make such an 
assessment, logically, the Convention must be applicable in the first place. It 
follows from this that this objection concerns the merits of the case but not 
the Conventions ‘jurisdiction’ ratione loci.
  
97  The High Court, however, 
understood this objection as concerning the question of attribution.
98  As 
such it found that the acts were attributable to the United Kingdom, since 
the British forces had physical custody and control of the claimants. They 
had it in their power to refuse to transfer the claimants to the custody of the 
IHT or indeed to release them, even though to act in such ways would be in 
breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under international law.
99
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94   R (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi), High Court, supra note 8, para. 59 (per Lord Justice 
Richards). 
95   Id., para. 61. 
96   Id., para. 56. 
97   This was also the approach of the ECtHR, see Al-Saadoon, supra note 2, para. 89. 
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As to the first argument, that Iraq is already exercising jurisdiction 
over the applicants in a legal sense, it can be countered that the Öcalan case 
shows that jurisdiction might also be determined on factual grounds, thus 
superimposing existing legal jurisdiction. The High Court, in this context, 
on the one hand pointed to “the fact […] that the claimants are at present in 
the physical custody of the British forces”.
100 On the other hand, it stated 
that it felt unable to distinguish this case from Al-Skeini with regard to the 
question of jurisdiction, thereby explicitly approving the analogy with the 
extraterritorial exception “for embassies and the like“.
101
3.  The Al-Saadoon Decision of the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales 
 Hence, it can be 
summarised that the High Court followed the House of Lord’s analysis in 
Al-Skeini, which construed an analogy to the Banković exceptions, to affirm 
UK jurisdiction over military prisons in Iraq but in its own analysis rather 
relied on factual criteria (“physical custody”) which is comparable to the 
ECtHR’s approach in Öcalan. 
The Court of Appeal viewed things differently, however. It 
understood the ECtHR’s ruling on Banković  and the House of Lord’s 
decision in Al-Skeini as containing “four core propositions” on jurisdiction, 
namely that it is an exceptional jurisdiction (1) to be ascertained in harmony 
with other applicable norms of international law (2), reflecting the regional 
nature (3) and indivisible nature (4) of the Convention rights. It deduced 
from the first and second of these propositions that they were to imply “an 
exercise of sovereign legal authority, not merely de facto power, by one 
State on the territory of another”. The power was to be given by law since, if 
it were given only by chance or strength, its exercise would by no means be 
harmonious with material norms of international law but offensive to them; 
there would be no principled basis on which the power could be said to be 
limited, and thus exceptional.
102
 
100   Id., para. 82. 
101   Id. 
  Therefore, according to the Court of 
Appeal, the exceptions contained in Banković  had to be construed in 
accordance with public international law rules on the delimitation of 
municipal legal orders – an assumption that we tried to refute above. For the 
Court of Appeal, factual control as recognised in Öcalan was no valid basis 
102   R (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi), Court of Appeal, supra note 2, para. 37 (per Lord Justice 
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for establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction.
103 When applying its analysis to 
the case at hand, it had to come to the conclusion that the detention of the 
appellants by the British forces at Basra did not constitute an exercise of 
Art. 1 jurisdiction by the United Kingdom because, before the expiration of 
the Security Council mandate on 31 December 2008, the United Kingdom 
had not been exercising any power or jurisdiction in relation to the 
appellants other than as agent for the Iraqi court. After that date, the British 
forces had no legal power to detain any Iraqi at all. Had they taken such 
action, the Iraqi authorities would have been entitled to enter the premises 
occupied by the British and recover any such person so detained.
104
The House of Lords refused to grant leave to appeal.
 
105
III.  The ECtHR’s Ruling on the Application on the Convention 
ratione loci in Al-Saadoon 
 
The ECtHR referred to its Banković decision as the leading authority 
as well. Thus it reiterated that “Art. 1 sets a limit, notably territorial, on the 
reach of the Convention” but that the Convention could be applied 
extraterritorially in exceptional cases. Nevertheless, the ECtHR came to the 
conclusion that the events in Iraq fell within the jurisdiction of the United 
Kingdom. It summarised the crucial facts as follows: The applicants were 
arrested by British armed forces in southern Iraq and later kept in British 
detention facilities until their transfer to the custody of the Iraqi authorities 
on 30 December 2008. During the first months of the applicants’ detention, 
the United Kingdom was an occupying power in Iraq. The two British-run 
detention facilities in which the applicants were held were established on 
Iraqi territory through the exercise of military force. The United Kingdom 
initially exercised control and authority over the individuals detained in the 
detention facilities solely as a result of the use or threat of military force. 
Subsequently, the United Kingdom’s de facto control over these premises 
was reflected in law. In particular, on 24 June 2004, CPA Order No. 17 
(Revised) provided that all premises currently used by the MNF should be 
 
103   Following the House of Lords’ judgment in Al-Skeini, the Court of Appeal only relied 
on Banković when deciding on the extraterritorial application of the HRA. 
104   R (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi), Court of Appeal, supra note 2, para. 40. 
105   See UK Parliament, Minutes of Proceedings of Monday 16 February 2009, 
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inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the MNF. 
This provision remained in force until midnight on 31 December 2008.
106
Accordingly, when summarizing the facts, the Court stressed the 
physical power that the agents of the United Kingdom had over the 
applicants when pointing to the fact that they were arrested by British forces 
and later held in custody in different British detention facilities. When 
stating that “[t]he United Kingdom exercised control and authority over the 
individuals” the Court already gave its result away; this being the same 
formulation as in Öcalan. The decisive passage reads: “The Court considers 
that, given the total and exclusive de facto, and subsequently also de jure, 
control exercised by the United Kingdom authorities over the premises in 
question, the individuals detained there, including the applicants, were 
within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction.”
  
107 Interestingly, the Court did 
not explicitly refer to Öcalan at this point but rather quoted the EComHR in 
the Hess case
108, which concerned the responsibility of the United Kingdom 
for the detention of the former Nazi leader Rudolf Hess in the Allied 
Military Prison in Berlin-Spandau. This reference is not very conclusive 
because it stems from the phase, described previously, when the 
Commission held a general presumption that the Convention also applies 
extraterritorially.
109
 
106   Al-Saadoon, supra note 
 Hence, the Court tried to suggest continuity in its case 
law on Art. 1 which plainly does not exist.  
With regard to the language, the Court is rather confirming Öcalan 
where factual control over a person is decisive as opposed to legal control, 
which was required in all the exceptions in Banković. Although the Court 
also points to the UK’s de jure control over the premises, this is not decisive 
for the case since the Court found the United Kingdom’s de facto control 
over the premises was only “reflected in law”. If something is only a 
reflection, conceptually it cannot be a constitutive factor but only 
declarative of something else – here the de facto control.  
2, paras 86-87. 
107   Al-Saadoon, supra note 2, para. 88. 
108   Hess, supra note 18. 
109   Accordingly, the decisive passage reads (p. 73): “The respondent Government takes 
place not in the territory of the United Kingdom but outside its territory, in Berlin. As 
the Commission has already decided, a State is under certain circumstances 
responsible under the Convention for the actions of its authorities outside its territory, 
[…]. The Commission is of the opinion that there is in principle, from a legal point of 
view, no reason why acts of the British authorities in Berlin should not entail the 
liability of the United Kingdom under the Convention.”   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  488 
The reason why the Court only cited Hess in the given case might be 
that, it would have had to admit that it had, inappropriately for a Chamber, 
established a new exception from Banković or at least extended the scope of 
the  Öcalan  exception. It should be recalled that the extraterritorial 
application of the Convention must be “exceptional” and requires “special 
justification in the particular circumstances of each case” according  to 
Banković.
110
E.  Extraterritorial Effects of the Convention 
  In  Öcalan,  the Turkish authorities exercised authority and 
control directly over one person by putting handcuffs on him and thereby 
arresting him. Immediately afterwards they transported him to Turkish 
territory, where Turkey is indisputably responsible under the Convention. 
Thus the ECtHR recognized Turkey’s extraterritorial jurisdiction for a 
crucial but rather short moment in time over one person on an individual 
basis. In Al-Saadoon, by contrast, the authority and control were not directly 
exercised over the applicants but over the premises in question, i.e. the 
British detention facilities. According to Banković, though, jurisdiction over 
premises was only foreseen when recognised under customary international 
law, a requirement which is not fulfilled in the case of military prisons. 
Instead the Court affirmed UK’s jurisdiction over a number of persons for 
an indeterminate time on a factual basis. This was not because of one single 
exceptional act but because of the ongoing factual control by means of the 
structures that the UK had set up. The UK was thereby in a situation to 
control all aspects of the applicants’ lives and thus to infringe in all the 
rights of the Convention and to omit all positive obligation under the 
former. Thus the Court established a new exception where de facto control 
trumps  de jure  control, or at least expanded the scope of the Öcalan 
exception.  
Related to, but not identical with, the question of the extraterritorial 
application of the Convention is the notion of extraterritorial effect, which 
played a role in both the Soering and the Al-Saadoon cases. 
In Soering, the applicant, who had fled from the United States to the 
United Kingdom, was prima facie within UK jurisdiction in the sense of 
Art. 1. The treatment contrary to Art. 3 would, however, be carried out in 
the United States and through US authorities however. This gave the UK 
government ground to argue that the Convention should not be interpreted 
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so as to impose responsibility on a contracting state for acts which occur 
outside its jurisdiction.
111 The Court, however, relying on “the spirit and 
intendment” of Art. 3 ECHR, extended the “inherent obligation not to 
extradite also […]  to cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the 
receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment” proscribed by Art. 3.
112 It further clarified that liability was 
incurred by the extraditing contracting state by reason of its having taken 
action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to 
proscribed ill  treatment.
113  It thereby introduced the principle of non-
refoulement within the scope of Art. 3 ECHR and admitted that this article 
could have an “extraterritorial effect”.
114 Strictly speaking, the legal concept 
of “extraterritorial effect” does not refer to the application of the Convention 
ratione loci.
115 It is rather concerned with the question of what constitutes 
the incriminating act: The concrete violation – putting somebody in a cell 
for years awaiting his execution – or establishing “the crucial link in the 
causal chain”
116 for the violation – extraditing someone to a place where this 
is bound to happen. By focusing on the latter, the violation fell undoubtedly 
within UK jurisdiction according to Art. 1.
117
Al-Saadoon differs from Soering in so far as the applicants already 
were on Iraqi territory to the effect that their transfer was not a trans-border 
issue.  Nevertheless it can also be understood as an extradition case 
considering that the Court has decided that the applicants were within UK, 
and not Iraqi, jurisdiction.
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116   So the Human Rights Committee has put it in a comparable case, Roger Judge v. 
Canada, Communication No. 829/1998, HRC (2003), UN Doc. CCPR/C/78/ 
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freedoms under the Convention is concerned, according to Art. 1, 
jurisdiction, and not territory, is the crucial criterion when defining the 
sphere in which a contracting state is responsible. Consequently, when 
affirming the Convention’s jurisdiction ratione loci  in its admissibility 
decision, the Court has implicitly affirmed that the Soering jurisprudence 
applies at least in principle.
119
Unlike  Soering  the applicants did not invoke the death-row 
phenomenon which would trigger the applicability of Art. 3 ECHR. Instead 
they submitted that there were substantial grounds for believing that they 
were at real risk of being subjected to an unfair trial before the Iraqi 
Tribunal, followed by an execution by hanging. They alleged that this would 
give rise to breaches of their rights under Arts 2, 3 and 6 of the Convention 
and  Art. 1 of Protocol No. 13 to the Convention.  The notion of 
extraterritorial effect, however, can only be applied to certain rights at the 
core of the Convention.
 
120  If  this was not the case then  the Convention 
would require the contracting parties to impose its standards on third states 
or territories
121 and to act as indirect guarantors of its freedoms “for the rest 
of the world”.
122  Whereas the Court in  Soering  explicitly  recognised a 
limited extraterritorial effect only with regard to Art. 3, it did neither in 
Soering  nor in later cases, exclude that under certain circumstances an 
extradition or expulsion might engage a contracting state’s responsibility 
under Art. 2 and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 6
123 as well as Arts 5,
124 6
125 and 
9.
126  The extraterritorial effect of Arts 2 and 3 was based on the 
“fundamental importance” of these provisions.
127
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and 9, prospect of arbitrary detention, denial of a fair trial or persecution on 
religious grounds in the receiving country must be “sufficiently flagrant”. 
128 Accordingly, in extradition cases the threshold for a violation of rights is 
different from Art. 3 which is an absolute right,
129 or Art. 2 which the Court 
held in another context to embody “the supreme value in the international 
hierarchy of human rights”,
130
I.  Imposition of Death Penalty 
 is higher than usual. 
First and foremost, the possible execution of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi 
could be in violation of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 13 concerning the abolition of 
the death penalty in all circumstances, which was ratified by the United 
Kingdom in October 2003. Since the Court has recognised that Protocol 
No. 6 on the abolition of the death-penalty has an extraterritorial effect, the 
same must hold true for Protocol No. 13, which extends the guarantees of 
Protocol No. 6 to include times of war. The applicants could thus 
successfully rely on the Soering principle with regard to Art. 1 Protocol 
No. 13 if they could establish that there were “substantial grounds”
131
In its previous case law, the Court has examined complaints under 
Art.  1 of Protocol No. 6 and Arts 2 (and 3 of the Convention where 
necessary) together.
 for 
believing that they would be sentenced to death.  
132 In casu, therefore, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi did not 
rely on Protocol No. 13 exclusively but submitted that the death-penalty was 
contrary to the right to life as guaranteed under Art. 2.
133 According to its 
wording, however, Art. 2 para. 1, does not prohibit the execution of a 
court’s sentence following a conviction of a crime for which this penalty is 
provided by law. The Al-Saadoon case would be covered by this exception. 
The applicants, however, argued that the exception cannot be relied on by 
those states which have ratified Protocol No. 13.
134 This argument can be 
endorsed for the sake of coherence.
135
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  Moreover, the Court, meanwhile, 
129   Chahal, supra note 6, para. 79; Ovey & White, supra note 114, 74; O’Boyle, supra 
note 31, 69. 
130   Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany [GC], Appl. Nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 
44801/98, ECHR 2001-II, para. 87. 
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134   Id.  
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even takes it for granted that the evolving consensus in Europe to outlaw 
capital punishment has lead to the exception under Art. 2 being inapplicable, 
independent of a single state’s ratification of Protocol No. 6 or 13, 
respectively.
136 Already in Soering, the Court considered the possibility that 
subsequent practice in national penal policy, in the form of a generalised 
abolition of capital punishment, could be taken as an abrogation to the 
exception provided for under Art. 2 para. 1
137 but ultimately rejected this 
idea.
138 Fourteen years later, the Court re-examined the matter in the Öcalan 
case mentioned above, in which the applicant had been sentenced to death 
by Turkish Courts.
139 The Chamber noted that “the legal position as regards 
the death penalty has undergone a considerable evolution since Soering was 
decided”. Stressing the fact that all the contracting states had signed, and all 
but three had ratified, Protocol No. 6 concerning the abolition of the death 
penalty in peacetime, and referring to the policy of the Council of Europe, 
which required that new member states undertake to abolish capital 
punishment as a condition of their admission into the organisation, the Court 
concluded that the “de facto  abolition” of the death penalty at the time 
Soering was decided had meanwhile developed into a “de jure abolition” 
during peacetime.
140  Against this background, it regarded capital 
punishment in peacetime as an unacceptable form of punishment that is no 
longer permissible under Art. 2.
141  The Grand Chamber followed this 
reasoning but also agreed with the Chamber that it was not necessary to 
reach any firm conclusion on these points since the case could be decided on 
other grounds.
142 Kaboulov, however,  In the recently decided case of   the 
Court held that “in circumstances where there are substantial grounds to 
believe that the person in question, if extradited, would face a real risk of 
being liable to capital punishment in the receiving country, Art. 2 implies an 
obligation not to extradite the individual. […] Furthermore, if an extraditing 
State knowingly puts the person concerned at such high risk of losing his 
 
136   Kaboulov, supra note 6, para. 99. 
137   Soering [GC], supra note 1, para. 103. 
138   Id. Different on this point: C. O. Judge De Meyer, Soering [GC], supra note 1, who 
also found a violation of Art. 2. 
139   Three years later though, on 3 October 2002 the Ankara State Security Court 
commuted the applicant’s death sentence to life imprisonment. Accordingly, the Court 
did not have to comment on the question whether the implementation, but only 
whether the imposition of the death penalty is contrary to the Convention. 
140   Öcalan, supra note 56, para. 195. 
141   Id., para. 196. 
142   Id., paras 163-165.   When Soering Went to Iraq…  493 
life as for the outcome to be near certainty, such an extradition may be 
regarded as ‘intentional deprivation of life’, prohibited by Art. 2 of the 
Convention.”
143 This is a rather surprising statement, given that the question 
was highly disputed before the Chamber and Grand Chamber in Öcalan. 
The Court, in support of its argument, cited a number of cases in which it 
supposedly came to the same conclusion.
144  However, in none of those 
cases did the Court base its finding on Art. 2 alone or circumvented definite 
decisions on the issue because the cases could be decided on other grounds 
– as could the case of Kabuloulov itself. Be that as it may,
145
II.  Unfair Trial 
 if the Court is 
meanwhile of the opinion that Art. 2 may be violated when a person is 
extradited to a country where he might face the death penalty, this must a 
fortiori be the case when the extraditing state has ratified Protocol No. 13. 
It is disputed between the parties in the Al-Saadoon case whether the 
“flagrant denial test” applies with regard to the alleged unfairness of the 
applicant’s expected trial. The parties built their arguments around the cases 
of Bader
146 and Öcalan.
147 In Bader, a case which concerned a Swedish 
decision on deportation, the Court held, inter alia, that an issue might arise 
under Arts 2 and 3 if a contracting state deported an alien who had suffered 
or risks suffering “a flagrant denial” of a fair trial in the receiving state, the 
outcome of which had been or was likely to be the death penalty.
148 The 
applicants countered that in Öcalan the Court had held that Art. 2 would be 
violated if a death sentence would follow an “unfair trial”, the latter not 
necessarily having to be “flagrantly” unfair.
149  This argument must be 
rejected, however, as Öcalan was not an extradition case and thus it cannot 
be taken for granted that it can be relied on in the present context.
150
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Accordingly, the applicants must establish that the trial before the IHT 
amounted to a “flagrant” denial of justice and that they were at real risk to 
be executed, in order to persuade the Court to find Arts 2 and 3 to be 
violated on that basis, irrespective of the aforementioned arguments 
concerning the imposition of the death penalty in se. 
Moreover, in the cases of Soering and Mamatkulov, the Court did “not 
exclude” that “an issue might exceptionally be raised under Art. 6 by an 
extradition decision in circumstances where the fugitive has suffered or 
risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial”.
151
In any event, the applicants would have to convince the Court that the 
trial before the IHT does not merely constitute an unfair trial but amounts to 
a flagrant denial of justice, which might be hard to establish. As to the 
fairness of the trial before the IHT, the applicants, citing reports from NGOs 
and from the UN General Assembly’s Human Rights Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention as well as the statements of an expert witness who had 
given evidence before British courts, claim that the defendants and the 
witnesses are subjected to extreme security risks including assassination. 
Additionally, they allege that judges are exposed to continual political 
interference. These shortcomings would explain a conviction rate of 78.4 % 
of the accused persons before the IHT, of which 35 % have been sentenced 
to death.
 Consequently, the Court in 
Al-Saadoon might also find a violation of Art. 6 if a risk of a flagrant denial 
of justice could be proven by the applicants, independently of the question 
whether they risk capital punishment or not. 
152
III.  Method of Execution 
  It is difficult to predict whether the ECtHR will follow the 
applicants. At any rate, the British Courts could not be convinced.  
Lastly, the Court could have the opportunity to decide on the matter if 
an execution by hanging amounts to inhumane and degrading treatment. The 
applicants argue that hanging was an ineffectual and extremely painful 
method of killing and thus contrary to Art. 3.
153
 
151   Soering [GC], supra note 
 The Court of Appeal denied 
this, admitting that errors had happened from time to time. Nevertheless, 
pointing to the Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 
1, para. 113; Mamatkulov [GC], supra note 125, para. 88. 
152   Al-Saadoon, supra note 2, para. 95. 
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which found that hanging was “speedy and certain”,
154 it was of the opinion 
that these mistakes were only “anecdotal” and “partial”, thus not giving rise 
to a violation of Art. 3.
155  The  ECtHR  has never faced the  question  of 
whether hanging constitutes a violation of Art. 3, and neither other human 
rights courts nor human rights treaty monitoring bodies explicitly 
commented on this subject. The United Nations Committee against Torture 
was  confronted with the question whether certain methods of execution 
might be in violation of Art. 1 (prevention of torture) or Art. 16 CAT (cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which does not amount to 
torture). In this context,  it raised concerns that executions in the United 
States which are conducted by lethal injection could be accompanied by 
severe pain and suffering and thus in violation of the above-mentioned 
rights.
156 With regard to Afghanistan, the Committee made clear that public 
hangings could be regarded as cruel and degrading punishment.
157 In the 
Inter-American system, where matters connected with the death-penalty are 
invoked more frequently than in its European counterpart, the Commission 
has repeatedly left the question open whether hanging constitutes cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, although petitioners have 
advanced such arguments in several cases.
158  Also the Human Rights 
Committee never took a stand on this point but only generally held that 
when imposing capital punishment in order to be in conformity with Art. 7 
ICCPR (prevention of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment), the execution of the sentence “must be carried out in such a 
way as to cause the least possible physical and mental suffering”.
159
 
154   Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949 – 1953 (1953) Cmd. 
8932, 247. 
 With 
regard to execution by gas asphyxiation it held that this would not meet the 
155   R (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi), High Court, supra note 8, paras 37, 68-69. 
156   Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture, United States 
of America, 25/06/2006; UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2, para. 31. 
157   Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture, Afghanistan. 26/06/93, 
UN Doc. A/48/44, para. 58. 
158   Dave Sewell v. Jamaica, Case 12.347, Report No. 76/02, IACtHR, Annual Report 
2002, OEA/Ser.L/V/II117 Doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002), para. 118; Benedict Jacob v. Grenada, 
Case 12.158, Report No. 56/02,IACtHTR, Annual Report 2002, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117 
Doc. 1 rev.1 (2002), para. 98; Joseph Thomas v. Jamaica, Case 12.183, Report No. 
127/01,IACtHR, Annual Report 2001, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.114 Doc. 5 rev. (2001), paras. 
133, 136. 
159   HRC, General Comment No. 20: Replaces general comment 7 concerning prohibition 
of torture and cruel treatment or punishment (Art. 7), 10/03/92, Supplement No. 40 
(A/47/40), annex VI.A, para. 6.   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  496 
test of “least possible physical and mental suffering”, and therefore would 
violate Art. 7 ICCPR.
160
F.  The Guarantees of the ECHR and Conflicting 
International Law Obligations  
 Accordingly, when adjudicating about the question 
whether hanging amounts to cruel and inhuman treatment, the ECtHR 
would enter terra nova  not only within its own jurisprudence but also 
beyond, which makes it unlikely that it would take position on this question 
if it could find a way to circumvent it. 
Additionally, the Al-Saadoon case raises fundamental questions about 
the relationship of the ECHR and other international law. This aspect was 
also inherent in the Soering judgment, where the Court as a matter of fact 
had to decide if the United Kingdom would be obliged to fulfil its 
obligations under the Convention, thus potentially violating its extradition 
treaty with the United States or the other way around. However the Court 
did not pick up this argument in Soering.
161 In Al-Saadoon, the potentially 
conflicting obligations are at the heart of the case, with the UK government 
arguing that the availability of the death penalty in Iraqi law and/or its 
imposition by the Iraqi courts would not, as such, be contrary to 
international law. Accordingly, any risk of its imposition would not justify 
the United Kingdom in refusing to comply with its obligation under 
international law to surrender Iraqi nationals, detained at the request of the 
Iraqi courts, to those courts for trial. The applicants, in contrast, deny that 
there was any international law obligation to transfer the applicants and that 
there was no legal basis that would justify the continuing detention after 
midnight on 31 December 2008.
162 In its admissibility decision, the Court 
considered the respective part of the application to be of such complexity 
that it should depend on an examination on the merits.
163
 
160   HRC,  Communication No 469/1991: Canada, 07/01/94, UN Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/ 
469/1991, para. 16.4. 
 But it already 
hinted at the possibility that the alleged legal obligation to transfer the 
161   Still, the argument was advanced. See Soering  [GC],  supra  note  1, para. 83 and 
further severe critique of the Soering judgment by K. Doehring, ‘Vertragskollisionen 
– Der Soering-Fall’, in J. Ipsen et al. (eds), Recht – Staat – Gemeinwohl: Festschrift 
für Dieter Rauschning (2001), 419. 
162   Al-Saadoon, supra note 2, para. 100. 
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applicants to Iraqi custody might be “modified or displaced” under the 
ECHR.
164
I.  The Interplay between the ECHR and International Law 
 
The relationship between the ECHR and international law has several 
facets.
165 This is due to the fact that the Convention can be qualified as both 
part of general international law
166 and a specific “instrument of European 
public order (ordre public) for the protection of individual human 
beings”.
167  Both features play a role in the case law of the Convention 
organs, thus unveiling the ambiguous status of the Convention. 
Accordingly, the Court has made use of general international law concepts 
when defining the concept of jurisdiction ratione loci  –  as  seen in 
Banković
168  –  and  ratione temporis,
169  and  when justifying the binding 
effect of interim measures of the Court
170 or when deciding questions of 
attribution.
171  However it has found an approach of its own to treaty 
reservations and their effects on the validity of states’ undertakings
172
 
164   Id., para. 89. 
165   See generally L. Wildhaber, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and 
International Law’, 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2007), 217. 
166   Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom [GC], Appl. No. 35763/97, ECHR 2001-XI, para. 55. 
 as 
167   Loizidou (Merits) [GC], supra note 21, paras 75, 93; Banković [GC], supra note 9, 
para. 80. 
168   Supra D. I. 3. 
169   Blečic v. Croatia [GC], Appl. No. 59532/00, ECHR 2006-III, cf. Wildhaber, supra 
note 165, 224. 
170   Cp. Cruz Varas, supra note 6 and Mamatkulov, supra note 125, para. 124. 
171   Although the Court has cited the relevant Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
International Organization of the ILC, the way it had made use of its content was 
subject to severe critique, see: A. Sari, ‘Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in 
Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases’‚ 8 Human Rights Law 
Review (2008)1, 151, A. Breitegger, ‘Sacrificing the Effectiveness of the European 
Convention on Human Rights on the Altar of the Effective Functioning of Peace 
Support Operations: A Critique of Behrami & Saramati and Al Jedda’ 11 
International Community Law Review (2009) 2, 155; M. Milanović & T. Papić, ‘As 
Bad as it Gets: The European Court of Human Rights’ Behrami and Saramati 
Decision and General International Law’, 58 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (2009) 2, 267. 
172   Belilos v. Switzerland,  ECtHR (1988), Appl. No.  10328/83,  Series A, No. 132; 
Loizidou  (Preliminary Objections) [GC], supra  note 21; see S. Åkermark, 
‘Reservation Clauses in Treaties Concluded Within the Council of Europe’, 48 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1999) 3, 479.   GoJIL 1 (2009) 3, 459-518  498 
well as to treaty interpretation.
173
II.  International Law Obligations Conflicting with the 
Convention in the Al-Saadoon Case 
 The Convention organs’ case law thus 
offers examples for both the claim for autonomy and the idea of applying 
the Convention in harmony with general international law. While acting in 
the  relatively autonomous legal system of the European Convention, the 
Court seems to have a certain degree of latitude whether to grant concepts of 
general international law entry into its system or to develop idiosyncratic 
approaches. The question is of a different nature, though, if a veritable norm 
conflict between the guarantees of the Convention and other international 
law obligations of the parties to the Convention arises. In such a situation, 
where a different legal regime has a legitimate claim to enter the 
Convention’s system, the Court cannot simply refuse entry if it expects to be 
followed in the future. Alternatively, if it chooses to do so, at least it has to 
increase its standard for justification. 
This last aspect would only be relevant for the decision on the merits 
in the Al-Saadoon case if there truly was a veritable norm conflict between 
the guarantees of the Convention and international law.  
1.  The United Kingdom-Iraq Memorandum of Understanding 
of 8 November 2004 Regarding Criminal Suspects  
The United Kingdom’s obligation under international law to transfer 
the applicants pursuant to the IHT’s request could conceivably have been 
based on the United Kingdom-Iraq Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
of 8 November 2004 regarding criminal suspects. Section 2, para. 1 
provides that the Interim Iraqi Government had  legal authority over all 
criminal suspects who have been ordered to stand trial and who are awaiting 
trial in the physical custody of the UK contingent of the MNF in accordance 
with the terms of the MoU. In Section 3, para. 3 lit. a the MoU reflects CPA 
Memorandum No. 3, issued on 27 June 2004. According to its Section 5 
 
173   Golder v. United Kingdom, ECtHR (1975), Appl. No 4451/70, Series A, No. 18, 
para. 29;  Banković  [GC],  supra  note 9, paras 55-8;  Loizidou  (Merits) [GC], supra 
note 21, paras 43-5, cf. Ovey & White, supra note 114, 38-55. For a thorough analysis 
of general international law concepts and, in particular general international law on 
treaties, before the ECtHR and the IACtHR see F. Vanneste, General International 
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para. 1, criminal detainees shall be handed over to Iraqi authorities as soon 
as reasonably practicable.
174 The CPA had been created by the Government 
of the United States and CPA Regulation No. 1 gave the CPA authority to 
issue binding regulations and orders. Interpreting the MoU in good faith 
(Art. 31 para. 1 VCLT), one could come to the conclusion that not 
transferring the applicants, who were criminal suspects, at the end of the 
mandate amounts to a violation of its provisions. Be that as it may, the MoU 
is not regarded to be a legally binding document
175
2.  The Sovereignty Argument 
  and thus does not 
establish an obligation competing with the Convention in the first place. 
To that effect, in its submissions the United Kingdom did not refer to 
its obligations stemming from the MoU. Instead they argued that if they had 
either released the applicants or given them safe passage to another part of 
Iraq, a third country or the United Kingdom, this would have amounted to a 
violation of Iraqi sovereignty and would have impeded the Iraqi authorities 
in carrying out their international law obligation to bring alleged war 
criminals to justice.
176 In the British judgments, the High Court held that to 
allow suspected war criminals to escape the jurisdiction of the Iraqi courts 
would be an obvious and serious interference in the Iraqi criminal process 
and a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.
177 The Court of Appeal had considered 
British forces to enjoy no legal power to detain any Iraqi after 31 December 
2008. Had the British forces done so, the Iraqi authorities would have been 
entitled to enter the premises occupied by the British and recover any such 
person so detained.
178 In a comparable case before the US Supreme Court, 
concerning two American citizens, the court took the view that because the 
claimants were being held by United States Armed Forces at the behest of 
the Iraqi Government pending their prosecution in Iraqi courts, release of 
any kind would interfere with the sovereign authority of Iraq.
179
The applicants in the Al-Saadoon case objected before the ECtHR that 
these observations on the issue focused on the sovereignty of Iraq and failed 
  
 
174   Al-Saadoon, supra note 2, para. 17. 
175   R (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi), High Court, supra note 8, para. 64. 
176   Al-Saadoon, supra note 2, para. 107. 
177   R (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi), High Court, supra note 8, para. 67. 
178   R (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi), Court of Appeal, supra note 8, para. 36. 
179   Munaf et al. v. Geren, Secretary of the Army, et al., No. 06–1666, US Supreme Court 
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to mention the United Kingdom’s sovereignty.
180 Indeed, sovereignty is a 
legal concept and not an a priori  principle. Rules and concepts of 
international law demarcate sovereignty. To date, the ECtHR has only cited 
documents concerning diplomatic asylum among the relevant international 
legal materials,
181
a)  Analogy to the Rules on Diplomatic Asylum? 
 while the issue of sovereignty has far more facets. The 
Court does not refer to the law of occupation, to case law concerning 
extraterritorial enforcement measures and competing claims to criminal 
jurisdiction and to the limits of Iraqi sovereignty established by human 
rights. These aspects should also be considered when examining the 
question of a potential violation of Iraqi sovereignty in case the UK would 
refuse to surrender the applicants. 
An analogy between the present case, in which prisoners detained in a 
military facility claimed a right not to be handed over to the territorial state, 
and the granting of diplomatic asylum was drawn by the High Court. It 
referred to the case of R (B) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs.
182 In this case children, who had sought asylum in 
Australia and were placed in a detention centre under conditions, which 
gave rise to serious concerns, claimed asylum in the British consulate in 
Melbourne. Having returned to Australian custody more or less voluntarily, 
they sought judicial review of the decision not to permit them to remain in 
the consulate, thus exposing them to the risk of treatment prohibited by the 
ECHR. The High Court in Al-Saadoon held that if, in the light of Art. 55 of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR),
183  the consular 
officials in B were under an international law obligation to hand over the 
fugitives to the Australian authorities, it was difficult to see why the British 
forces in this case were not under an international law obligation to hand 
over the claimants to the Iraqi court which had asserted jurisdiction over 
them and at whose order and behest the claimants were being held in 
custody.
184
 
180   Al-Saadoon, supra note 
  This coincides with the British courts’ reasoning on the 
2, para. 100. 
181   Id., paras 64-65. 
182   R (B) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2005] QB 643. 
183   Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
184   See (R) Al-Skeini, supra note 81, para. 132 (per Lord Brown), Baroness Hale and Lord 
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jurisdictional question regarding the detention facilities, which was also 
construed as an analogy between embassies and military prisons.
185
The British courts correctly held that diplomatic asylum is not 
permissible in general. In the Asylum Case of 1950, the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) held that a decision to grant diplomatic asylum involved a 
derogation from the sovereignty of that state since it withdrew the offender 
from the jurisdiction of the territorial state and constituted an intervention in 
matters exclusively within the competence of that state. Such a derogation 
from territorial sovereignty could not be recognised unless its legal basis 
was established in each particular case.
  
186 Arts 22 and 41 of the Vienna 
Convention  on Diplomatic Relations  (VCDR) do not alter the position 
regarding the right of sending states to give diplomatic asylum in 
circumstances.
187  As for customary international law, it is very doubtful 
whether a right of asylum for either political or other offenders is 
recognised.
188  A recent study comes to the conclusion  that diplomatic 
asylum is at least not universally recognised in international law. Unless 
certain narrow conditions are met, the granting of diplomatic asylum 
constitutes an intervention and a violation of territorial sovereignty.
189 
According to the study, the principles of non-intervention and territorial 
sovereignty allow an exception only in cases where both the receiving state 
violates human rights obligations under treaty or customary international 
law and the sending state itself is bound to the respective human rights. The 
reasoning is based on arguments developed to justify humanitarian 
interventions – a much disputed concept itself.
190
 
185   Supra D. II. 2. 
186   Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), ICJ Reports. 1950, 266, 274-275. 
187   Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. Cf. 
E. Denza, Diplomatic Law, 2nd ed. (2004), 118, 381, with further references. Also cf. 
para. 5 of the preamble to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations where the 
parties affirm that that the rules of customary international law should continue to 
govern questions not expressly regulated by the provisions of the present Convention. 
  
188   Cf.  Asylum Case,  supra  note  186, 274-278; I. Brownlie,  Principles of Public 
International Law, 7th ed. (2008), 357; J. Combacau & S. Sur, Droit international 
public, 7th ed. (2006), 358. 
189   I. Klepper, Diplomatisches Asyl: Zulässigkeit und Grenzen (2009), 111-112; to the 
same effect: H. Carrie, Das Diplomatische Asyl im gegenwärtigen Völkerrecht (1994), 
146-148. 
190   Since the Ambassador of Honduras to the Netherlands filed an “Application 
instituting proceedings by the Republic of Honduras against the Federative Republic 
of Brazil” on 29 October 2009, the ICJ might again have the opportunity to illuminate 
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For the case at hand, however, even the acknowledgment of such a 
right would not make a difference, since the analogy with diplomatic 
asylum stands on shaky ground for several reasons: First and foremost, the 
same argument as already advanced with regard to the jurisdiction question 
still holds true: In contrast to diplomatic and consular premises on the basis 
of Art. 22 VCDR and Art. 31 VCCR, military prisons simply do not have 
any special status in international law.
191 Second, the activities of the UK in 
Iraq reach much further than those of a diplomatic mission. Finally, the 
applicants did not voluntarily seek asylum but were detained against their 
will. Accordingly, the UK cannot rely on the sovereign rights which would 
emanate from an analogy to the impermissibility of diplomatic asylum.
192
b)  Application of the International Humanitarian Law on 
Occupation? 
 
This leads to the question whether the UK forces can be qualified as 
an occupying power in the relevant period of time and whether the treatment 
of the applicants can be judged on the basis of, or at least analogous to, the 
rules on occupation, which also bestow certain rights on the occupying 
power normally to be exercised by the sovereign state. The ECtHR has 
already stated in its admissibility decision that the occupation of Iraq ended 
in June 2004,
193 thus adopting the English courts’ determination.
194
 
Brazil, which gave refuge in its embassy in Honduras to “former” Honduran President 
José Manuel Zelaya and some of his supporters, “does not have the right to allow the 
premises of its Mission in Tegucigalpa  to be used to promote manifestly illegal 
activities by Honduran citizens who have been staying within it for some time now 
and that it shall cease to do so.” (cf. Press Release of the International Court of Justice 
No. 2009/30 of 20 October 2009). Although the political activities of Zelaya are 
central to the affair, some general remarks on the right to “diplomatic asylum” could 
finally be expected. 
 Indeed, 
at first glance, the application of the law of occupation may seem to be far-
fetched since Security Council Resolution 1546 of 8 June 2004 announced 
that by 30 June 2004 the sovereign Interim Government of Iraq “will 
assume full responsibility and authority […] for governing Iraq”, “the 
191   See Thienel, supra note 55, 127. 
192   To the same effect: Bhuta, supra note 8, 13, 15. 
193   Al-Saadoon, supra note 2, para. 14. 
194   R (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi), High Court, supra note 8, para. 13; R (Al-Saadoon and 
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occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to 
exist”.
195
According to their common Article 2 para. 2, the four Geneva 
Conventions apply “to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory 
of a High Contracting Party, even if the occupation meets with no armed 
resistance”. Still, although the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 contains 
specific rules applicable in situations of occupation in its Arts 47-78, it does 
not provide for a definition of occupation. As mentioned earlier,
 Yet, such an understanding is not imperative. 
196 such a 
definition can be found in Art. 42 of the Hague Regulations,
  197  which 
stipulates: “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under 
the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the 
territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” 
Since Arts 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations draw on questions of fact,
198 
the end of occupation also ultimately depends on a factual determination of 
effectiveness, to be made according to the situation on the ground.
199
Thus, despite the announcement of the Security Council in its 
Resolution 1546 that occupation will end by 30 June 2004, the decisive test 
remains whether Iraqi territory is “actually placed under the authority” of 
 This is 
sustained by the Fourth Geneva Convention Art. 6 para. 3 GC IV prescribes 
that  “[i]n the case of occupied territory, the application of the […] 
Convention shall cease one year after the general close of military 
operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration 
of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of 
government in such territory, by the provisions of [Articles] 1 to 12, 27, 29 
to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143. Protected persons whose release, 
repatriation or re-establishment may take place after such dates shall 
meanwhile continue to benefit by the present Convention.” 
 
195   SC Res. 1546 (2004), 8 June 2004, operative paras 1-2. 
196   Supra D. I. 3. 
197   For the relationship between the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention see Article 154 GC IV. 
198   Cf. E. Benvenisti, ‘Occupation, Belligerent’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law  (2009), paras 5-11, available at 
www.mpepil.com (last visited 7 December 2009). 
199   D. Thürer & M. McLaren, ‘”Ius post Bellum” in Iraq: A challenge to the applicability 
and relevance of international humanitarian law?’, in K. Dicke  et al. (eds), 
Weltinnenrecht: Liber amicorum Jost Delbrück (2005), 763, 769; cf. A. Roberts, 
‘Occupation, Military, Termination of’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law  (2009), paras 9-34, availavle at 
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UK forces as required by Art. 42 of the Hague Regulations.
200 Similarly, 
Art. 47 IV GC states that protected persons who are in occupied territory 
shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the 
benefits of international humanitarian law by any agreement concluded 
between the authorities of the occupied territories and the occupying power. 
If the transfer of authority to the local government is not sufficiently 
effective, an ensuing consent to the presence of troops does not lead to an 
end of occupation. The British Military Manual also points out that the law 
relative to military occupation is likely to be applicable if occupying powers 
operate indirectly through an existing or new appointed indigenous 
government.
201
As for the end of occupation in Iraq on the basis of an “actual 
authority test”, authors particularly refer to operative paragraph 12 of 
Security Council Resolution 1546, which provides that “the mandate for the 
multinational force shall be reviewed at the request of the Government of 
Iraq or twelve months from the date of this resolution, and that this mandate 
shall expire upon the completion of the political process set out in 
paragraph 4”, and that it “will terminate this mandate earlier if requested by 
the Government of Iraq”.
  
202 This formulation was taken up by operative 
paragraph 2 of the last relevant Security Council Resolution, No. 1790 
(2007) of 18 December 2007, which reads “[The Security Council] 
[d]ecides further that the mandate for the multinational force shall be 
reviewed at the request of the Government of Iraq or no later than 15 June 
2008, and declares that it will terminate this mandate earlier if requested by 
the Government of Iraq”. Since the mandate depends on its request, it can be 
reasoned that the Iraqi Government exercised actual authority and that it 
was difficult to continue to speak of an occupation after June 2004.
203
 
200   Cp. K. Dörmann & L. Colassis, ‘International Humanitarian Law in the Iraq Conflict’, 
47 German Yearbook of International Law (2004), 292, 311. 
201   UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law or Armed Conflict (2004), 276, 
para. 11.3.1. 
202   Emphasis added. For the argument that the handover of governmental control in the 
substantive sense can be determined on the basis of the timing of the democratic 
elections by the local population in occupied territory, which would mean that the 
election held in January 2005 marks the end of occupation see Y. Arai-Takahashi, The 
Law of Occupation (2009), 19-24. This criterion, however, mingles factual criteria 
with considerations of legitimacy not based on IHL. 
 
However, there is no real guarantee that the Security Council will be in a 
position to withdraw the MNF if requested. It depends on a decision of the 
203   Dörmann & Colassis, supra note 2000, 311.   When Soering Went to Iraq…  505 
Security Council according to the voting rules of Art. 27 of the UN Charter, 
including the right of veto of the permanent members of the Security 
Council. Furthermore, from a practical point of view, it seems unrealistic 
that the Interim Government could simply ask the Security Council to 
withdraw the MNF unless the Interim Government wanted to take a strong 
stand against the US and other countries supporting the MNF, with all the 
negative consequences arising from such a stance. Accordingly it can be 
assumed that a request to be successful depends on implicit US approval 
before submitting it to the Security Council.
204 Apart from that, Security 
Council Resolution 1546 is ambiguous. Whereas the first paragraph of the 
preamble and the first two operative paragraphs suggest that the occupation 
is officially over, this is somehow complicated or even contradicted by the 
Security Council’s subsequent authorisation of the maintenance of a 
multinational force to counter ongoing security threats in operative 
paragraph 10. It can be said that even if the occupation in Iraq was officially 
over, the (former) occupying powers were still permitted to hold on to 
important state prerogatives.
205  In addition, it has been argued that the 
relevant Security Council resolutions all demand, explicitly or by reference 
to, respect for international humanitarian law and the law of occupation, at 
least that no derogation from the rules of occupation can be presumed.
206 
Accordingly, it does not go without saying that the law of occupation has 
not applied since July 2004.
207
 
204   A. Carcano, ‘End of the Occupation in 2004? The Status of the Multinational Force in 
Iraq After the Transfer of Sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government’, 11 Journal of 
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Finally, an application of IHL by analogy to international territorial 
administration in peace operations is considered suitable at least in 
principle.
208  Arts 79-135 GC IV contain regulations of treatment for 
detainees. According to Art. 133 paras 1 and 2, internment shall cease as 
soon as possible after the close of hostilities. However, internees in the 
territory of a Party to the conflict, against whom penal proceedings are 
pending for offences not exclusively subject to disciplinary penalties, may 
be detained until the close of such proceedings and, if circumstances 
require, until the completion of the penalty. The same shall apply to 
internees who have been previously sentenced to a punishment depriving 
them of liberty. Art. 77 GC IV demands that protected persons who have 
been accused of offences or convicted by the courts in occupied territory be 
handed over at the close of occupation, with the relevant records, to the 
authorities of the liberated territory. This is an absolute obligation not 
allowing derogation. However, the provision aims at excluding possible 
circumventions of the prohibition of deportations set out in Arts 49 and 76 
GC IV.
209 Accordingly, since the applicants agreed to be transferred to the 
United Kingdom, the rule should not apply in their case.
210
c)  Extraterritorial Enforcement Measures and Competing 
Claims to Criminal Jurisdiction 
  
In summary, the application of the law of occupation depends on 
several factors which are difficult to evaluate. If it is applicable, Art. 77 
GC IV need not necessarily validate the Iraqi claim to transfer the applicants 
at the end of the mandate. 
Finally, Al-Saadoon could be conceptualised as a matter of competing 
claims of criminal jurisdiction and of extraterritorial enforcement measures. 
Before the ECtHR, the United Kingdom explicated that releasing the 
applicants or giving them safe passage would have impeded the Iraqi 
authorities in carrying out their international law obligation to bring alleged 
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war criminals to justice.
211
Since the applicants were charged with war crimes, Iraq and the UK 
could establish competing claims of criminal jurisdiction based on the 
nationality and the territoriality principle on the one hand and on the passive 
personality principle and the universality principle on the other hand.
 This argument, though, would only give rise to a 
veritable norm conflict if Iraq’s exclusive jurisdiction was violated.  
212 
Arts 64-78 GC IV contain special rules on criminal jurisdiction in occupied 
territory. In its Al-Saadoon judgment, the High Court held that jurisdiction 
within a state’s own territory, and in particular over a state’s own nationals 
within this territory, was prima facie exclusive and that jurisdiction was in 
casu not affected by the presence of the MNF on the territory. To allow 
suspected war criminals to escape the jurisdiction of the Iraqi courts would 
be obvious and serious interference in the Iraqi criminal process and a 
violation of Iraqi sovereignty.
213  This is correct insofar as UK criminal 
jurisdiction would not allow the UK agents to apprehend suspect persons 
abroad.
214 Indeed, it cannot simply be inferred from the UK’s legitimate 
claim to prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction that the UK has the 
necessary extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction to carry out this 
jurisdiction to prescribe and to adjudicate.
215 Without the consent of the host 
state, the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction is unlawful because it violates 
the state’s right to respect for its territorial integrity.
216
In cases of transboundary abductions, however, arguments drawn 
from the rights and obligations of states vis-à-vis  each other and from 
 Viewed as a matter 
of inter-state relations, the answer to this question does not depend on 
whether the individuals concerned have consented to being  transferred 
abroad.  
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human rights law do not contradict each other. The ECtHR held in the 
Öcalan case mentioned above that a deprivation of liberty is inadmissible 
under Art. 5 para. 1 if it occurs in violation of the sovereignty of the host 
state or other norms of international law.
217
However, it might be relevant that, in casu, the applicants have been 
apprehended and detained until the end of the mandate with the consent of 
the territorial state. If the treatment the applicants expect in Iraq violated 
Iraq’s own human rights obligations stemming from standards shared by 
Iraq and the UK, a valid argument can be made that the UK’s denial to 
transfer them would not have been in contradiction with Iraqi sovereignty. 
The scope of a state’s sovereignty and domaine réservé is not fixed but is 
determined both by the treaty obligations of a state and the state of 
development of customary international law.
 In the case at hand, by contrast, 
sovereignty may be violated in order to avoid human rights violations. 
218  Since both the United 
Kingdom and Iraq are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),
219 it would not be too far-fetched if the United 
Kingdom could refer to Iraq’s human rights obligations erga omnes (partes) 
under  the  shared standard of the  ICCPR and deny the transfer of the 
applicants. If the applicants must expect to be sentenced to death in 
violation of guarantees of fair trial, this could violate not only Art. 14 
(procedural guarantees in civil and criminal matters) but also Art. 6 para. 2 
ICCPR (right to life), which demands that sentence of death must not be 
imposed contrary to the provisions of the ICCPR.
220
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landmark case of Judge v. Canada, the Human Rights Committee held that 
abolitionist states must not remove, by deportation or extradition, 
individuals from their jurisdiction if it may be reasonably anticipated that 
they will be sentenced to death, without ensuring that the death sentence 
would not be carried out.
221 To be clear, this common human rights standard 
only justifies the simple denial to transfer the applicants, even if detained on 
behalf of Iraq, but not the extraterritorial exercise of enforcement 
jurisdiction to enforce this standard. Still, before the mandate actually 
expired on 31 January 2008, the United Kingdom arguably was in a legal 
position to avoid handing over the applicants.
222
III.  Strategies to Cope with International Law Norms 
Competing with the Convention 
 
Even if the refusal to hand over the applicants was illegal under 
general international law, it is not certain if, and to what extent the Court 
would find the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Convention 
breached. As the case law of the Court shows, it has developed different 
strategies to cope with potential conflicts of international law and the 
Convention, mostly avoiding them in the first place. 
1.  Displacing the Substantive Convention Obligations 
A first method of solving such norm conflicts could be simply to 
displace the substantive Convention obligations or even to deny jurisdiction. 
This was the approach of the English Court of Appeal in the case of B.
223 It 
held that, if the Soering approach was to be applied to diplomatic asylum, 
the duty to provide refuge can only arise under the Convention under certain 
conditions to the effect that it was understood to be compatible with public 
international law.
224
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The decision of the EComHR in the Hess case already mentioned
225 
was understood as indicating that treaties entered into before the Convention 
was in force may displace substantive Conventions obligations.
226
However, this is not the approach generally chosen by the Convention 
organs.  In the past, they have rather held that a state bound by the 
Convention cannot invoke conflicting treaty obligations.
 In Hess, 
after having denied that the participation in the exercise of the joint 
authority over Spandau Prison could bring the applicant detained in that 
prison under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, the Commission also 
commented on the agreement establishing the Allied prison obiter dicta: 
“The conclusion by the respondent Government of an agreement concerning 
Spandau prison of the kind in question in this case could raise an issue 
under the Convention if entered into when the Convention was already in 
force for the respondent Government. The agreement concerning the prison, 
however, came into force in 1945. Moreover, a unilateral withdrawal from 
such an agreement is not valid under international law.”  
227 Conversely, as 
far as treaty obligations predating the Convention are concerned, the Court 
took an approach totally different from that of the Commission in Hess. In 
Slivenko,
228  the  Grand Chamber  rejected the argument that a treaty 
obligation entered into prior to the Convention could be qualified as a 
“quasi-reservation” to the Convention. By contrast, it emphasised that in the 
absence of specific reservations, ratification of the Convention by a state 
presupposed that any law then in force in its territory and any provisions of 
international treaties which a contracting state had concluded prior to the 
ratification should be in conformity with the Convention.
229
Whereas the cases mentioned so far concerned treaties with regional 
reach at best, it is even doubtful whether Convention guarantees could be 
frustrated by competing international law obligations which result from the 
UN Charter. In its Art. 103 the Charter claims precedence over all other 
conventional international obligations, thus arguably  stipulating a 
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‘hierarchy’.  In the House of Lords’ Al-Jedda  case,
230  the lead opinion 
delivered by Lord Bingham proceeded on the basis that Art. 103 UN Charter 
was applicable also to mere authorizations by the Security Council and 
claimed primacy with regard to the ECHR despite its special character as a 
human rights instrument.
231  It came to the conclusion that there was a 
genuine norm conflict between an express authority of the Security Council 
and Art. 5 para. 1 ECHR, and accepted that the former prevailed. However, 
the UK had to ensure that a detainee’s rights under Art. 5 are not infringed 
to any greater extent than is inherent in such detention.
232 Accordingly the 
presumption must be that member states will, as far as possible, carry out 
these measures in conformity with existing international law, unless 
otherwise indicated.
233
Coming back to Al-Saadoon, it  is doubtful whether the Court will 
opine that Iraqi sovereignty displaces conventional obligations. So far, it has 
shown a certain reluctance to explicitly recognise a pre-emptive effect of 
Art. 103 UN Charter with respect to the Convention.
  
234 Accordingly, despite 
the fact that the fundamental principle contained in Art. 2 para. 1 UN 
Charter is at stake, and that the relevant Security Council Resolutions 1483 
(2003), 1546 (2004) and 1790 (2007) all emphasise the primacy of Iraqi 
sovereignty,
235 the Court will supposedly not regard substantive obligations 
as generally displaced by virtue of a competing Charter law.
236
2.  Determining the Content of General International Law 
 
Of course, the ECHR will not, as argued above, set aside potentially 
conflicting norms under general international law simply because they are 
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not part of the Convention system. It has repeatedly stated that the 
Convention “cannot be interpreted in a vacuum” but “must also take the 
relevant rules of international law into account”.
237
An example of a field of international law which is characterised by a 
good deal of legal uncertainty is the law of state immunity. Cases of the 
Court relevant in this context concern the right of access to court under 
Art. 6. In Fogarty,
 More sophisticatedly, 
the Court could avoid a norm conflict in the first place by determining the 
content of general international law. This method might not be suitable 
where the allegedly conflicting norm flows from a clear treaty provision as 
in an extradition treaty but might be powerful with regard to indeterminate 
rules of unwritten general international law, especially where the law is in 
flux. 
238 the applicant applied unsuccessfully for posts at the 
US Embassy and considered her rejection unlawful under UK 
discrimination legislation; in McElhinney,
239 the applicant, an Irish national, 
claimed damages against the British government for psychological injuries 
resulting from the acts of a British soldier on the Northern Ireland Border, 
and in the case of Al-Adsani
240, the applicant claimed compensation from 
the Kuwaiti Government and a Sheikh related to the Emir of Kuwait for 
detention and torture  in a Kuwaiti State Security Prison for having 
circulated a sexual videotape of the Sheikh. In all these cases the domestic 
courts denied jurisdiction on grounds of state immunity, thus possibly 
violating Art. 6 para. 1. Also, in all three cases the applicants argued that 
public international law did not require the granting of state immunity, 
because an exception existed for their respective cases. Accordingly, the 
applicant in Fogarty claimed the existence of an exception to state immunity 
with respect to  employment-related disputes,
241  McElhinney  was of the 
opinion that such an exception existed with regard to personal injury caused 
by an act or omission within the forum state,
242 whereas in Al-Adsani the 
argument was brought forward that immunity could not be claimed for 
instances of torture.
243
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opportunity to take part in the development of international law and granted 
the convention states a margin of appreciation when deciding on the state of 
international law.
244 Only in Al-Adsani did it undertake a detailed analysis 
of the state of relevant customary international law.
245 Yet this might be due 
to the fact that the question whether the ius cogens prohibition of torture 
might suspend the principle of state immunity is more controversial than the 
alleged exceptions in the other cases and thus the rejection required a higher 
degree of justification. In the end the Court concurred with the British 
government that the exception was not to apply to Al-Adsani.
246
Similarly, in  the cases of Waite and Kennedy
 
247  and  Beer and 
Regan
248, which concern the privileges and immunities of an international 
organisation, the Court held that it was primarily for the national authorities, 
notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation  of domestic 
legislation, including domestic law which “refers to rules of general 
international law or international agreements.” The Court regarded its own 
role to be confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such an 
interpretation are compatible with the Convention.
249
Thus it can be said that the Court does not make use of this strategy to 
determine the content of general international law in a way that avoids 
conflicts with the Convention. It rather prefers to grant the contracting states 
a certain leeway to determine the state of international law themselves. For 
the judgment in Al-Saadoon, this could mean that the Court will limit itself 
to concluding that the behaviour of the UK at issue was based on a 
maintainable understanding of Iraqi sovereignty. In abstract terms, this can 
be welcomed on the one hand since, according to Art. 32, the jurisdiction of 
the Court extends only to matters concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Convention and the protocols, and not to general 
international law. On the other hand, it is questionable whether the 
respective national courts are in positions better suited to make this 
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determination if it does not concern a bilateral treaty obligation only, but a 
norm under general international law. 
3.  Conflicting International Law Obligations as a “Legitimate 
Aim” under the Convention 
In most of the cases, the ECtHR regarded competing international law 
obligations as a “legitimate aim” under the Conventions and hence subject 
to a proportionality test. This can be seen in the immunity cases mentioned 
above with regard to Art. 6. In determining whether the right of access to a 
court was violated, the Court accepted the grant of sovereign immunity to a 
state in civil proceedings in order to “comply [...] with international law to 
promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of 
another State’s sovereignty” as a legitimate aim under the Convention.
250 
Thus the Court seems to be of the opinion that, independently from the 
content of the obligation or principle, compliance with international law is a 
legitimate aim under the Convention per se. In doing so, the Grand 
Chamber subjected the granting of state immunity in the present cases to the 
usual proportionality test. Still, it did not treat the principle of state 
immunity in the same manner as any “legitimate aim” flowing from national 
decisions, but emphasised that “[t]he Convention should so far as possible 
be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it 
forms part, including those relating to the grant of State immunity”, 
explicitly relying on Art. 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT in this context.
251 From this 
follows the Court’s presumption that “measures taken by a High 
Contracting Party which reflect generally recognised rules of public 
international law on State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as 
imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to court as 
embodied in Art. 6 § 1.”
252
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  Thus it can be concluded that, although the 
Court subjects cases in which states act in a certain way in order to comply 
with international law to an examination under the Convention, it allows for 
a presumption that such an act is proportionate, thus avoiding a norm 
conflict to a certain extent. 
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In the cases of Waite and Kennedy and Beer and Regan concerning 
the immunity of an international organisation, the Grand Chamber did not 
see a legitimate aim in the compliance with the respective constitutive 
agreement of the international organisation, but still referred to its privileges 
and immunities as “an essential means of ensuring the proper functioning of 
such organisations free from unilateral interference by individual 
governments”.
253 Also when balancing this aim against the Convention, it 
did not allow for a presumption of proportionality but decided this question 
by examining whether the applicant “had available to them reasonable 
alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the 
Convention.”
254
If the Court were to follow this approach in Al-Saadoon, it would, in 
all likelihood, find respect for Iraqi sovereignty –  if it would be truly 
violated by the refusal of the surrender – to be a “legitimate aim” under the 
Convention. Also the proportionality test might be modified by the 
presumption that the UK had acted proportionately by respecting Iraqi 
sovereignty. As far as Art. 3 is concerned, however, the proportionality test 
does not apply. The prohibition provided by Art. 3 against ill treatment is 
absolute also in expulsion cases
 Accordingly, in this context the Grand Chamber was not as 
generous towards Germany’s international obligation as in the state 
immunity cases. This might be explained by the fact that, had the Court 
found a violation of the Convention, a norm conflict would have existed 
between the Convention and a multilateral agreement on the immunity of a 
regional European organization but not between the European Convention 
and a universal norm of international law. For obvious reasons, the Court 
might have felt in a better position to displace a norm in the first set of facts 
than in the latter. 
255
4.  Requiring a System of “Equivalent Protection” in Cases 
Regarding International Obligations 
  so that it is difficult to see how 
international law could affect its application in Al-Saadoon. 
In cases in which a state acted in a certain way in order to comply 
with obligations flowing from its membership in an international 
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organisation, the Strasbourg organs have developed an approach of their 
own to determine the conformity of the contracting state with the 
Convention. This approach was initially developed by the Commission in 
the case of M. & Co.,
256 in which the applicant claimed a violation of the 
Convention by Germany because its authorities had issued a writ for the 
execution of a judgment of the European Court of Justice according to 
which it had to pay a heavy fine for having violated the EC Treaty. There 
the Commission held that “the Convention does not prohibit a Member State 
from transferring powers to international organizations” but that such a 
transfer of powers in turn “does not necessarily exclude a State’s 
responsibility under the Convention with regard to the exercise of the 
transferred powers. Otherwise the guarantees of the Convention could 
wantonly be limited or excluded […]. The object and purpose of the 
Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings 
requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its 
safeguards practical and effective”.
257  It concluded that the “transfer of 
powers to an international organisation is not incompatible with the 
Convention provided that within that organisation fundamental rights will 
receive an equivalent protection”.
258
The Grand Chamber endorsed this decision in its Bosphorus 
judgment,
  
259 a case in which the applicant claimed that Ireland had violated 
the Convention by impounding its aircraft, whereas Ireland argued that it 
had only implemented an EC Council Regulation. The Court emphasised 
“the growing importance of international co-operation and of the consequent 
need to secure  the proper functioning  of international organizations”, as 
already recognised in Waite and Kennedy and Bear and Regan.
260 It further 
stated that “compliance with EC law by a Contracting Party constitutes a 
legitimate general interest objective within the meaning of Art. 1 of Protocol 
No. 1”.
261
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 As to the “equivalent protection” test, it slightly modified the M. 
& Co. approach, stating that “State action taken in compliance with such 
legal obligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is 
considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive   When Soering Went to Iraq…  517 
guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a 
manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the 
Convention provides. However, any such finding of equivalence could not 
be final and would be susceptible to review in the light of any relevant 
change in fundamental rights’ protection.”
262 It follows from this that the 
Grand Chamber accepts that compliance with all EC law is a legitimate aim 
under the Convention and that – comparably to Waite and Kennedy and 
Bear and Regan – the possible infringement flowing from this is justified as 
long as the international organisation offers a system of equivalent 
protection, both procedurally as well as substantially. The Court has 
continuously confirmed this jurisprudence and extended it to other 
international organisations.
263
In the Al-Saadoon case, the third party interveners have relied on this 
case law and accordingly argued that “[i]n a line of cases, the Court had 
considered treaties providing for the transfer of competencies to 
international organisations and held such transfers to be generally 
permissible but only provided that Convention rights continued to be 
secured in a manner which afforded protection at least equivalent to that 
provided under the Convention.”
 
264  Therefore, the group of interveners 
submitted that “similar principles should apply where a subsequent 
international obligation of a contracting  state, by treaty or otherwise, 
provided for joint or co-operative activity with another State, that impacted 
on the protection of Convention rights within the Contracting State’s 
jurisdiction.”
265  It is true that the Court has also applied this approach 
recently mutatis mutandis in contexts other than in those in which a state has 
only complied with binding obligations flowing from membership.
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However, expanding this case law to the case at hand, where a possible 
norm conflict might arise between the Convention and Iraq’s sovereignty, 
does not seem to fit the pattern. First, the relationship between Iraq and the 
United Kingdom might be based on a form of co-operation now but has 
certainly not been entered into on this premise. Requiring the United 
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Kingdom to either establish a system of equivalent protection in Iraq or 
leave the country (or even not invade) seems to be beside the point. Second, 
this approach is only suitable when a new subject of law is established 
whose legal order may be shaped by its creators. Iraq obviously is an 
original subject of law and the United Kingdom is not in the position to 
determine its legal system. Accordingly, this approach seems rather ill-
suited for the case at hand. 
G.  Conclusion 
Although  Al-Saadoon  has only been decided with regard to its 
admissibility, it can already be said that the Court has left behind the spirit 
of the much criticised Banković decision. It was speculated that the Court 
decided Banković the way it did under the impressions of September 11, and 
in so doing it attempted not to restrict the fight against terrorism with human 
rights obligations.
267 By declaring the European Convention under certain 
circumstances applicable on the territory of Iraq, this era has surely passed. 
The Court is following a trend in which courts and treaty monitoring bodies 
are rejecting an a priori  subordination of their human rights protection 
system to international security concerns.
268
 
267   Lawson, supra note 
 Whether Al-Saadoon will be a 
milestone for the protective system of human rights will be seen once the 
Court (and subsequently possibly the Grand Chamber) has delivered its 
decision on the merits. At any rate, in the age of globalisation, de-
territorialisation and trans-nationalisation, its practical importance will be 
comparable to that of the Soering case. 
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